On the Formation of Producers’ Information‐Sharing Coalitions

He, Qiao‐Chu; Chen, Ying‐Ju; Shen, Zuo‐Jun Max

doi:10.1111/poms.12852

Cited by 30 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…By reducing the negative effect of yield uncertainty and price fluctuation, Tang et al (2015) found that agricultural information enables farmers to improve their operations and make better production planning decisions, bringing higher profits. Furthermore, some studies explore the information provision mechanism to examine whether the wider dissemination of information will always benefit farmers (He et al, 2018;Liao & Chen, 2017;Zhou et al, 2021). Therein, Liao et al (2019) concluded that providing such information always benefits farmers at the individual level but may not maximize the welfare at the aggregate level.…”

Section: Agricultural Information Servicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Government subsidy policy for green and efficient raw materials considering farmer heterogeneity

Guo

Cheng

2022

Production and Operations Management

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To protect soil quality for sustainable development and raise farmers' incomes, agricultural firms are increasingly developing green and efficient raw materials (GRMs) that can improve crop yields and reduce soil damage compared to TRMs. However, farmers have heterogeneity in both the trust in agricultural information and sustainable development attitudes, leading to underestimation of the value of GRMs. This paper explores the optimal subsidy policy of the government to promote GRMs considering the effect of farmer heterogeneity using a government‐firm‐farmer Stackelberg game. Our analysis reveals that the government should subsidize both farmers and the GRM firm when the GRMs' effectiveness is not high enough; otherwise, it is more effective to subsidize farmers but not the GRM firm. Such a government subsidy policy can bring a win–win–win outcome for farmers, the GRM firm, and social welfare under certain conditions. Although higher farmers' trust in agricultural information or sustainable development attitudes can increase their subjective willingness to adopt GRMs, counterintuitively, the total farmer surplus will decrease because in this situation: (1) the government will reduce the subsidy to farmers or (2) the GRM firm will increase the GRM price. In addition, compared with considering two‐dimensional heterogeneity of farmers, considering only one‐dimensional heterogeneity or no heterogeneity of farmers will cause the government subsidy to deviate from the goal of promoting GRMs, resulting in a 59.3% reduction in GRM market demand, a 17.3% decrease in the profit of GRM firm, and possibly even making the GRM firm “die out.”

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Section: Agricultural Information Servicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Government subsidy policy for green and efficient raw materials considering farmer heterogeneity

Guo

Cheng

2022

Production and Operations Management

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“…The above researches focus on what is the retailer’s condition for sharing her private information with other participants ( Zhang Q. et al, 2019 ). A few studies have shown that manufacturers as participants in the supply chain can also share information in some cases where the manufacturer possesses better demand information than the downstream retailer ( Jiang et al, 2016 ; Zhou et al, 2017 ; He et al, 2018 ). In addition, information sharing may occur between retailers and consumers ( Liu Y. et al, 2019 ).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

To Share or Not to Share? The Role of Retailer’s Information Sharing in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2022

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Retailers are faced with a dilemma of whether to share demand information with other supply chain members, and if so, how to share it. Our research interest is motivated by the grounds that the value of downstream retailers’ sales information to upstream manufacturers is to improve the accuracy of manufacturers’ order forecasting. This problem is particularly important in the remanufacturing of closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs). In this study, we consider a retailer (she) as the demand information holder, who sells new and remanufactured products in wholesale to a manufacturer (he) and, simultaneously, she and the manufacturer competitively collect used products from the customers. We explicitly characterize the role of information sharing in a CLSC. We contributed to the information-sharing literature by integrating the existing information-sharing model with dual recycling channels and channel power structure. Previous literature suggests that retailers prefer to share demand information with other firms when the market demand is high. However, surprisingly, we find that when the manufacturer does not play a leading role, the retailer shares her forecast demand information with the manufacturer if the market demand is low. We also show that information sharing reduces the overall profit of the supply chain when the manufacturer dominates the market. In addition, our results also illustrate that information sharing affects the performance of the supply chain mainly by affecting the wholesale price.

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“…When faced with yield uncertainty, a group of independent agricultural producers are willing to form a coalition to jointly offer their aggregate output as a single entity in a market (He et al ., 2018). The coalition, on the one hand, leverages the complementarity among its constitutive members’ outputs to mitigate the risks caused by yield uncertainty by taking advantage of the risk‐pooling effect.…”

Section: Problem Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract farming problems and games under yield uncertainty

Shi

Cao

2020

Aus J Agri & Res Econ

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This study investigates whether a group of independent agricultural producers willingly forms a coalition to jointly cope with yield uncertainty in contract farming. The agricultural producers' cooperative game problem in contract farming is formulated as a two-stage stochastic linear program. Using the strong duality theory of stochastic linear programs, we not only prove that the core of agricultural producers' cooperative game is nonempty but also provide a simple way to compute a profit allocation policy in the core. We establish the convexity of agricultural producers' cooperative game so that the game has population monotonicity, which gives agricultural producers an incentive to expand their current coalition. We then analyze the agricultural producers' cooperative game with a concave cost structure, which may exhibit economies of scale for production. Taking advantage of the proposed stochastic duality approach, the agricultural producers' cooperative game with a concave cost structure is also shown to have a nonempty core.

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On the Formation of Producers’ Information‐Sharing Coalitions

Cited by 30 publications

References 39 publications

Government subsidy policy for green and efficient raw materials considering farmer heterogeneity

Government subsidy policy for green and efficient raw materials considering farmer heterogeneity

To Share or Not to Share? The Role of Retailer’s Information Sharing in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

Contract farming problems and games under yield uncertainty

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