On the heterogeneity of dowry motives

Abstract

Dowries have been modeled as pre-mortem bequests to daughters or as groom-prices paid to in-laws. These two classes of models yield mutually exclusive predictions, but empirical tests of these predictions have been mixed. We argue that the heterogeneity of findings can be explained by a heterogeneous world-some households use dowries as a bequest and others use dowries as a price. We estimate a model with heterogeneous dowry motives and use the predictions from the competing theories in an exogenous switching regression to place households in the price or bequest regime. Our empirical strategy generates multiple, independent checks on the validity of regime assignment. Using retrospective marriage data from rural Bangladesh, we find robust evidence of heterogeneity in dowry motives in the population; that bequest dowries have declined in prevalence and amount over time; and that bequest households are better off compared to price households on a variety of welfare measures.

Marital transfers and the welfare of women

“…On the other hand, customary cash dowry has a very significant positive effect. This is consistent with the suggestion that the cash component of the marital transfer from the bride's family is likely to be part of the groomprice for the groom's family rather than a bequest dowry for the bride (Arunachalam and Logan 2006).…”

“…Botticini's (1999) analysis of dowry in Renaissance Italy finds that rather than being just a groomprice or just a bequest, a dowry can actually perform both functions at the same time, compensating for the spouses' attributes on the one hand, while enhancing the bride's welfare on the other. A different kind of heterogeneity is suggested by Arunachalam and Logan (2006). Assuming that the two motives of bequest are mutually exclusive within a marriage, they find robust empirical evidence from a Bangladesh data set that both are at work in the population.…”

“…Most existing studies focus on the phenomenon and the causes of dowry inflation (e.g. Anderson 2003, 2007a, 2007b, Arunachalam and Logan 2006, 2008, Edlund 2000, Maitra 2006, and Rao 1993, 2000. Bloch and Rao (2002) examine the threat of domestic violence as a bargaining instrument for extracting dowry in rural India, but a more direct critique of the bequest model is offered by Suran et.al (2004), who study the effect of dowry on domestic violence in rural Bangladesh.…”

The Dowry as a Crime in Disguise of Gifts: Evidences from Sadar and Faridganj Upazilla of Chandpur District

“…So, they have to face domestic violence because men do not have to pay any cost for domestic violence (Chowdhury 2010). Arunachalam & Logan (2006) on their research established two models of dowry. One is the price model where the bride"s family gives dowry to the groom"s family to equilibrate the marriage market.…”

“…Another one is the bequest model when parents consider that, as their daughter is leaving home and do not inherent her father's property so, she should be given something as an alternative. This thing keeps women away from their father"s property (Arunachalam & Logan 2006). Bates et al (2004) have shown that there is a relationship between dowry and bride"s age.…”