2017
DOI: 10.1214/17-aap1283
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On the instability of matching queues

Abstract: A matching queue is described via a graph, an arrival process, and a matching policy. Specifically, to each node in the graph there is a corresponding arrival process of items, which can either be queued or matched with queued items in neighboring nodes. The matching policy specifies how items are matched whenever more than one matching is possible. Given the matching graph and the matching policy, the stability region of the system is the set of intensities of the arrival processes rendering the underlying Ma… Show more

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Cited by 60 publications
(28 citation statements)
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“…They show that the optimal policy is of threshold form under vertical and unidirectionally horizontal differentiated types. Ding et al (2021) allow the matching utilities to depend on the class of buyer and seller and perform a fluid analysis of a greedy policy, and Bušić and Meyn (2015) minimize linear holding costs in a system without classdependent matching utilities or abandonment but also find that matches are not made until there is a sufficient number of agents in the market (see Moyal and Perry 2017, where these systems are referred to as matching queues, for other references to these types of models). Gurvich and Ward (2014) and Nazari and Stolyar (2019) study a control problem in a more general setting than the aforementioned studies, where arriving customers wait to be matched to agents of other classes.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They show that the optimal policy is of threshold form under vertical and unidirectionally horizontal differentiated types. Ding et al (2021) allow the matching utilities to depend on the class of buyer and seller and perform a fluid analysis of a greedy policy, and Bušić and Meyn (2015) minimize linear holding costs in a system without classdependent matching utilities or abandonment but also find that matches are not made until there is a sufficient number of agents in the market (see Moyal and Perry 2017, where these systems are referred to as matching queues, for other references to these types of models). Gurvich and Ward (2014) and Nazari and Stolyar (2019) study a control problem in a more general setting than the aforementioned studies, where arriving customers wait to be matched to agents of other classes.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…it does not contain any odd strong cycle. It is intuitively clear that the construction of stable stochastic matching models on hypergraphs is somewhat reminiscent of that of perfect matchings on a growing hypergraph that replicates the matching hypergraph a large number of times in the long run (in the case of graphs, see the discussion in Section Section 7 of [19]). This connection has a simple illustration in the next proposition, which provides a family of probability measures, naturally including the uniform measure on V, that cannot stabilize a matching model on the hypergraph H unless the latter satisfies Hall's condition.…”
Section: Proposition 8 Any R-partite Hypergraph H Is Non-stabilizablementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The complete 3-uniform k-partite hypergraphs generalize the complete k-partite graphs introduced in [17, p. 4], also called separable graphs in [16] and [19], or blow-ups of the complete graph of order k in some other references. Roughly speaking, a complete 3-uniform k-partite hypergraph is a version of the complete 3-uniform graph of order k, in which the k nodes are replicated several times, each of the k sets of replicas forming an independent set I i , such that all replicas of the same set do not share any hyperedge with each other, but all share hyperedges of size 3 with all other pairs of replicas belonging to two different other sets of replicas.…”
Section: Complete 3-uniform Hypergraphsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…On another hand, it is proven in Mairesse and Moyal (2016) that the matching policy 'Match the Longest' has a maximal stability region, that is, the latter necessary condition is also sufficient (we then say that the latter policy is maximal). However, Moyal and Perry (2017) shows that in fact, aside for a particular class of graphs, random policies are never maximal, and that there always exists a strict priority policy that isn't maximal either. Then, by adapting the dynamic reversibility argument of Adan et al (2018a) to the GM models, Moyal et al (2021) shows that the matching policy First Come, First Matched (FCFM) is also maximal, and derives the stationary probability in a product form.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%