On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences

Rubinstein, Ariel; Safra, Zvi; Thomson, William

doi:10.2307/2951543

Cited by 137 publications

(83 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Instead, we consider a very simple but simultaneous version of the Rubinstein et al (1992) procedure where the probability with which the relationship may end after a failure to reach agreement will be exogenous and may take any value in [0,1].…”

Section: Probabilistic Demand Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first of our demand games is in the tradition of Howard (1992) and Rubinstein et al (1992). These papers avoided the multiplicity of equilibria without resorting to smoothing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To think so would be a mistake. Our second demand game yields the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. This demand game takes its inspiration from the Rubinstein et al (1992) version of the Nash demand game. Their original feature pertains to a player-induced endogenous break-down probability of the procedure.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Nash demand game and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution

Anbarcı¹,

Boyd²

2011

Games and Economic Behavior

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Abstract. We introduce two new variations on the Nash demand game. One, like all known Nash-like demand games so far, has the Nash solution outcome as its equilibrium outcome. In the other, the range of solutions depends on an exogenous breakdown probability; surprisingly, the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome proves to be the most robust equilibrium outcome. While the KalaiSmorodinsky solution always finishes on top, there is no possible general ranking among the remaining solution concepts considered; in fact, the rest of the solution concepts take their turns at the bottom at various bargaining problems, depending on the specifics of the bargaining setup.

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Section: Probabilistic Demand Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first of our demand games is in the tradition of Howard (1992) and Rubinstein et al (1992). These papers avoided the multiplicity of equilibria without resorting to smoothing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Nash demand game and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution

Anbarcı¹,

Boyd²

2011

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…Axiomatic bargaining without expected utility has been studied in other articles (Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson, [13]; Safra and Zilcha, [14]; Safra, Zhou, and Zilcha, [15]; Burgos, Grant, and Kaji, [1]; and Volij and Winter, [22]). The paper of Volij and Winter [22] is closest to the present paper.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems

Köbberling

Peters

2003

Journal of Economic Theory

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Bargaining problems are considered where the preferences of the bargainers deviate from expected utility but can be modelled according to rank dependent utility theory. Under rank dependent utility both the utility function and the probability weighting function influence the risk attitude of a decision maker. The same definition of risk aversion leads to two forms of risk aversion: utility risk aversion and probabilistic risk aversion. The main finding is that these two forms can have surprisingly opposite consequences for bargaining solutions that exhibit a weak monotonicity property. In particular, in a large class of bargaining problems both increased utility risk aversion and decreased probabilistic risk aversion of the opponent are advantagous for a player. This is demonstrated for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. The Nash bargaining solution does not behave regularly in this respect.

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“…In Nash's formulation, it is assumed that the players are expected utility (EU) maximizers. Recently, Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson [ 15 ] reinterpreted Nash's bargaining problem. The ordinal Nash solution that they define is characterized by axioms that refer to the preference relations alone.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Existence and Uniqueness of Ordinal Nash Outcomes

Hanany¹,

Safra²

2000

Journal of Economic Theory

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In tiffs paper we present necessary and sufficient conditions Ibr existence and uniqueness of ordinal Nash outcomes. These outcomes are derived from the ordinal Nash solution a reinterpretation and an extension of the Nash bargaining solution that allows bargainers to have preference relations that are more general than expected utility. Out task is undertaken by the construction of a new notion called "induced utilities'.Journaltt/Ecommfic LiteratmeClassification Number: C78. ~!, 2000Academic Press

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On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences

Cited by 137 publications

References 15 publications

Nash demand game and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution

Nash demand game and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution

The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems

Existence and Uniqueness of Ordinal Nash Outcomes

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