2012
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-29326-9_4
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On the Logic of Lying

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Cited by 26 publications
(34 citation statements)
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“…A lie is not necessarily a false statement but rather a statement that deviates from what its author actually knows, believes or holds to be true [29]. Instances of this concept can be realized in our setting by thinking of an (intentional) lie or hoax as the uttering/extrusion of a statement by an agent which is inconsistent with what he or she believes to be true.…”
Section: Derived Notions and Applicationsmentioning
confidence: 97%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…A lie is not necessarily a false statement but rather a statement that deviates from what its author actually knows, believes or holds to be true [29]. Instances of this concept can be realized in our setting by thinking of an (intentional) lie or hoax as the uttering/extrusion of a statement by an agent which is inconsistent with what he or she believes to be true.…”
Section: Derived Notions and Applicationsmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Social phenomena such as lies, utterance, opinions have been recently studied in epistemic (doxastic) logic [26,28,29]. We follow [29] and regard lies as utterances by an agent that are inconsistent with their beliefs.…”
Section: Concluding Remarks and Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In van Ditmarsch et al (2012) the believed public announcement of ϕ is modelled as non-deterministic choice between such truthful and lying public announcement of ϕ, so that 'after truthful announcement of ϕ, ψ' corresponds to ϕ → [ϕ]ψ, and 'after lying announcement of ϕ, ψ' (after the lie that ϕ, ψ) corresponds to…”
Section: Definition 3 (Semantics) Assume An Epistemic Model M = (S Rmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is because on any epistemic model, the model restriction semantics and the arrow restriction semantics result in bisimilar models, on the part of the model wherein the announcement is true. Investigations of these correspondences are made in Kooi (2007) and van Ditmarsch et al (2012).…”
Section: Definition 3 (Semantics) Assume An Epistemic Model M = (S Rmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…9 The logic KTB (also known as B or Br or Brouwer's system) has been propounded by Floridi as the logic of the notion of 'being informed'. One of the main differences between the logic of this notion and the standard logic of knowledge is the absence of introspection 8 (Sakama et al, 2010) and (van Ditmarsch et al, 2011) provide two independent logical accounts of the notion of lying and other kinds of deception using epistemic logic (resp. dynamic epistemic logic).…”
Section: Epistemic Principlesmentioning
confidence: 99%