On the Mahāyāna and Wittgenstein

Gudmunsen, Chris

doi:10.1016/0048-721x(74)90002-5

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 1 publication

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Instead, not only do comparisons disagree about how we should interpret Wittgenstein's philosophy but also about which Wittgenstein too. Therefore, it is not clear whether we should see Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka 1 as comparable with either the 'early' Wittgenstein of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Waldo 1975(Waldo , 1978Matilal 2002;McEvilley 1982;Anderson 1985;Garfield 1995Garfield , 1996Garfield , 2002Tillemans 1999;Garfield and Priest 2003;Priest 2009Priest , 2015 or the 'later' Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations (Streng 1967;Hudson 1973;Gudmunsen 1974Gudmunsen , 1977Waldo 1975Waldo , 1978Katz 1981;Huntington Jr 1989Vukomanovic 2004;Tillemans 2003Tillemans , 2016Tillemans , 2017.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Snakes and Ladders’ – ‘Therapy’ as Liberation in Nagarjuna and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

Smith

2021

SOPHIA

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper reconsiders the notion that Nagarjuna and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus may only be seen as comparable under a shared ineffability thesis, that is, the idea that reality is impossible to describe in sensible discourse. Historically, Nagarjuna and the early Wittgenstein have both been widely construed as offering either metaphysical theories or attempts to refute all such theories. Instead, by employing an interpretive framework based on a ‘resolute’ reading of the Tractatus, I suggest we see their philosophical affinity in terms of a shared conception of philosophical method without proposing theses. In doing so, this offers us a new way to understand Nagarjuna’s characteristic claims both to have ‘no views’ (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 13.8 and 27.30) and refusal to accept that things exist ‘inherently’ or with ‘essence’ (svabhāva). Therefore, instead of either a view about the nature of a mind-independent ‘ultimate reality’ or a thesis concerning the rejection of such a domain, I propose that we understand Nagarjuna’s primary aim as ‘therapeutic’, that is, concerned with the dissolution of philosophical problems. However, this ‘therapy’ should neither be confined to the psychotherapeutic metaphor nor should it be taken to imply a private enlightenment only available to philosophers. Instead, for Nagarjuna and Wittgenstein, philosophical problems are cast as a source of disquiet for all of us; what their work offers is a soteriology, a means towards our salvation.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Snakes and Ladders’ – ‘Therapy’ as Liberation in Nagarjuna and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

Smith

2021

SOPHIA

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Chociaż Nagardżuna nie zgodziłby się z wszystkim, co pisał Wittgenstein, to jednak paralele istniejące między Dociekaniami filozoficznymi a madhjamaką są znaczące i godne uwagi. Jego zdaniem zarówno Nagardżuna w Odparciu argumentów (Vigrahavyāvartanī) (21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26)(27)(28) Znaczenie Wittgensteina docenił czołowy amerykański buddolog R. Thurman. Jego zdaniem był on pierwszym filozofem Zachodu, który pokazał, w jaki sposób umysł jednostki projektuje na świat treść swojego umysłu, a następnie "odczytuje" go, tak jakby rzeczywiście tam był.…”

unclassified

Wittgenstein and Buddism - a comparison

Sieradzan¹

2013

Idea

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The ‘Empty Mind’ of Professor Canfield

Gudmunsen

1977

Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In reply to John V. Canfield's recent article, 'Wittgenstein and Zen', 1 I have one main point to make: it is important to understand that thoughts are empty, and not that minds can be empty of thoughts. Canfield's central idea is that for both Wittgenstein and Zen, language and understanding do not require thought. The Zen ideal is to live free of thoughts, but in such a way that one can still do ordinary things, including speaking meaningfully and, most important, understanding what is said by others. This, we are told, is clarified by Wittgenstein's insistence that understanding a sentence does not involve the positing of a series of mental acts or processes; or in other words does not require thoughts. I think that Canfield has gone wrong in his interpretation of Mahdydna Buddhist philosophy, but there is nothing the matter with his understanding of Wittgenstein. He sets out the way in which Wittgenstein rejects a certain picture of understanding (or, for that matter, knowing, willing, meaning and others)-a picture of these as internal processes with which I can be privately acquainted. If we understand a sentence, we do not do it by comparing the words in it with our private images of their meanings. We 'just understand' the original sentence. Language is ultimately grounded, not on thoughts, but on 'just doing' things, as Canfield says. His more contentious claim is that it is possible to manage without thoughts altogether, by 'just doing' things. The crucial link with Zen is that Nirvana or enlightenment is simply 'acting without thought'. According to Canfield, the enlightened person is able to do everything we can do, but he 'just does' it. All that stands between us and enlightenment is our thoughts, which cover up the fact that understanding is operating quite well without them. The enlightened and the unenlightened person are both able to use and understand words properly, and what unites these two is certain underlying 'practices'-the fact, for instance, that both of them, when asked to bring a red flower, bring a red and not a blue one. Their agreement in the use of words is not based on the supposition that the word 'red' refers to something; perhaps to an essence of red with which each can be privately acquainted and take a peep at when he needs to understand a sentence containing the word 'red'.

show abstract

On the Mahāyāna and Wittgenstein

Cited by 3 publications

References 1 publication

‘Snakes and Ladders’ – ‘Therapy’ as Liberation in Nagarjuna and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

‘Snakes and Ladders’ – ‘Therapy’ as Liberation in Nagarjuna and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

Wittgenstein and Buddism - a comparison

The ‘Empty Mind’ of Professor Canfield

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About