On the Management of Shared Fish Stocks: Critical Issues and International Initiatives to Address Them

Munro, Gordon R.; Willmann, Rolf; Cochrane, Kevern L.

doi:10.1002/9780470999936.ch6

Cited by 13 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…The Management component considers how well the management system works to gather information, both from science and stakeholders, and integrate it into policymaking. The Management Inputs dimension reflects the state of enforcement efforts [ 49 ], extent of shared stock (e.g., [ 50 ]), the level of subsidies [ 51 ], and the amount of fishery income that is expended simply managing the fishery. Greater management resources may improve the understanding of fish stocks and lead to better management and larger sustainable harvests.…”

Section: The Structure Of the Fpismentioning

confidence: 99%

The Fishery Performance Indicators: A Management Tool for Triple Bottom Line Outcomes

et al. 2015

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Pursuit of the triple bottom line of economic, community and ecological sustainability has increased the complexity of fishery management; fisheries assessments require new types of data and analysis to guide science-based policy in addition to traditional biological information and modeling. We introduce the Fishery Performance Indicators (FPIs), a broadly applicable and flexible tool for assessing performance in individual fisheries, and for establishing cross-sectional links between enabling conditions, management strategies and triple bottom line outcomes. Conceptually separating measures of performance, the FPIs use 68 individual outcome metrics—coded on a 1 to 5 scale based on expert assessment to facilitate application to data poor fisheries and sectors—that can be partitioned into sector-based or triple-bottom-line sustainability-based interpretative indicators. Variation among outcomes is explained with 54 similarly structured metrics of inputs, management approaches and enabling conditions. Using 61 initial fishery case studies drawn from industrial and developing countries around the world, we demonstrate the inferential importance of tracking economic and community outcomes, in addition to resource status.

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Section: The Structure Of the Fpismentioning

confidence: 99%

The Fishery Performance Indicators: A Management Tool for Triple Bottom Line Outcomes

et al. 2015

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“…Under the 1982 UN Convention, the coastal states sharing a transboundary stock, while being admonished to enter into negotiations, with a view to managing the resource cooperatively, are not required to reach an agreement. Hence, non-cooperative management of the transboundary fish stock is countenanced under the 1982 UN Convention (UN, 1982; Munro et al ., 2004). We can refer to this as the default option.…”

Section: A Review Of the Management Of Internationally Shared Fisherymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More importantly, a DWFS, hitherto not a member of the RFMO, may apply for membership. The 1995 UN Agreement makes it clear that the ‘charter’ members of a RFMO cannot bar prospective new entrants, new members, outright (UN, 1995, Articles 8, 10 and 11; Munro et al ., 2004). This gives rise to the so-called ‘New Member Problem’ (Kaitala and Munro, 1993).…”

Section: A Review Of the Management Of Internationally Shared Fisherymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It has now come to be recognized that the management of internationally shared fishery resources is one of the most significant, if not the most significant, resource management issues to have arisen under the EEZ regime. The FAO estimates that as much as one-third of world marine capture fishery harvests are based upon such shared stocks (Munro et al ., 2004).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Game theory and the development of resource management policy: the case of international fisheries

Munro¹

2009

Envir. Dev. Econ.

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This paper is not concerned with advances in game theory. Rather, the paper is concerned with the relevance, if any, of game theory to a major resource management issue, namely the management of internationally shared fishery resources. It is argued that the economics of the management of such resources cannot, in fact, be understood, other than through the lens of game theory. The paper discusses several elementary game theory concepts that are of utmost policy relevance, but which are, as of yet, poorly understood by most policy makers. The paper does, in addition, discuss a key policy problem in the management of shared fishery resources that demands a game-theoretic analysis. The required analysis, however, has yet to be developed.

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“…Academic scholarship on international fisheries (and environmental) agreements suggest that (full) cooperation is ideal (Munro 2004, Bailey et al 2010, Hannesson 2011. Much of this literature, however, focuses on state-to-state cooperation and not on the myriad other 'private' or market actors that also cooperate to reach sustainability outcomes.…”

Section: Tuna Institutions Facing Dynamic Interestsmentioning

confidence: 99%

New tuna regimes

Yeeting¹

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On the Management of Shared Fish Stocks: Critical Issues and International Initiatives to Address Them

Cited by 13 publications

References 13 publications

The Fishery Performance Indicators: A Management Tool for Triple Bottom Line Outcomes

The Fishery Performance Indicators: A Management Tool for Triple Bottom Line Outcomes

Game theory and the development of resource management policy: the case of international fisheries

New tuna regimes

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