On the meaning and the epistemological relevance of the notion of a scientific phenomenon

Apel, Jochen

doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9620-y

Cited by 13 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…As Schindler (2007Schindler ( , 2011 demonstrates, theory provides the framework for both interpreting and describing data. Therefore, in contrast to Bogen and Woodward's original proposal that defends the independence of data from theory, Schindler and others such as Apel (2011) and Brown (1994) emphasize the impossibility of detecting patterns or other relevant information in data without using a substantive conceptual supporting theory. The theory allows us to identify what is relevant and can therefore serve as evidence for the phenomenon.…”

Section: Implications For Qualitative Researchmentioning

confidence: 89%

Reconsidering theoretical naïveté in psychological qualitative research

Bendassolli

2014

Social Science Information

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This article proposes a reconsideration of the view that, in order to better grasp the objects they study, qualitative researchers should bracket their preconceived ideas, particularly their theoretical assumptions. This view has led to the advocacy of theoretical naïveté in the context of research, particularly in qualitative settings. We argue that such naïveté presupposes a simplistic dichotomy between theory and empirical data and, therefore, drawing from current developments in the philosophy of science, we propose reconsidering the view of theoretical naïveté in light of the distinction between theory, phenomena, and data. After discussing approaches that do not recognize the phenomenon as a mediator between theory and data or that do so only partially, we propose an approach that explicitly assigns a mediating role to phenomena. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications that substantive rehabilitation of theory in the construction of scientific phenomena will have for qualitative research in general and for psychology in particular.Keywords empirical reconstruction, epistemology of science, phenomena, role of theory, theoretical naïveté, theorization in qualitative research Résumé L'article remet en perspective la vision selon laquelle les chercheurs à orientation qualitative devraient, afin de mieux appréhender les objets qu'ils étudient, mettre entre parenthèses leurs idées préconçues et en particulier leurs présupposés théoriques. Cette perspective a conduit à un plaidoyer en faveur de la naïveté théorique dans le contexte de la recherche, en particulier dans le domaine qualitatif. L'auteur défend la thèse qu'une telle naïveté présuppose une dichotomie simpliste entre théorie et données empiriques et, par conséquent, en s'appuyant sur les développements actuels

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Section: Implications For Qualitative Researchmentioning

confidence: 89%

Reconsidering theoretical naïveté in psychological qualitative research

Bendassolli

2014

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“…In the target article, I posit that theories are about phenomena-robust and recurring features in the world. More specifically, theories seek to explain such phenomena (Apel, 2011;Woodward, 2011). In psychology, phenomena include that a considerable proportion of people will experience panic attacks in their lifetime; that subtests on intelligence scales are highly intercorrelated; and that most mental disorders do not seem to have simple, monocausal explanations.…”

Section: What Are Theories Aboutmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theories and models: What they are, what they are for, and what they are about

Fried¹

2020

Preprint

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In Fried (this issue), I argue that a lot of work in the social sciences generally—and in psychology specifically—reads like an exercise in statistical model fitting, and falls short of theory building and testing in three ways. First, theories are absent, which fosters conflating statistical models with theoretical models. Second, theories are latent, i.e. implied but not explicated. Third, theories are weak, i.e. ambiguous and impossible to test or reject because they fit any data. I focus on psychometric factor and network models and their applications to cognitive, personality, and clinical psychology, showing that selecting statistical models that impose assumptions consistent with the theories they are supposed to corroborate is necessary for bringing data to bear on these theories. Seven commentaries agree with some of the core challenges the field faces. They raise some important criticisms of the target article, and provide extensions by identifying further problems and potential solutions. Here, I aim to integrate some of the core points and criticism raised, and provide a brief primer on theory formation, structured into three sections: 1) what are theories; 2) what are theories for; 3) and what are theories about. This is followed by a section dedicated to the question 4) how to develop theories. I conclude with 5) specific obstacles to theory formation psychological scientists face, and how they can be overcome.

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“…It is exactly this "flexibility" of the data in relation to the theory that allows them to be explained in different ways, even though referring to the same phenomenon -in philosophy of science, it is known as the problem of the under-determination of theory by evidence (Quine, 1975). This is because, in the process of empirical reconstruction, different methods generate different data -which, in turn, can produce different patterns to be interpreted (Apel, 2011).…”

Section: Phenomenon Theory Causes and Reasonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The construction base of explanatory models in social sciences and humanities is settled on an optimal solution of the theoryphenomenon-data triad (e.g., Apel, 2011;Bailer-Jones, 2009;Bendassolli, 2014;Bogen & Woodward, 1988;Schindler, 2011;Valsiner, 2000). Explanatory models are representations and interpretative and simplified descriptions of the relations that show themselves in the manifestation of a phenomenon.…”

Section: Problematizing the Construction Of Explanatory Models In Wopmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explanatory models for work and organizational phenomena: Epistemological, theoretical, and methodological issues

Gondim¹,

Pedro²,

Coelho³

et al. 2016

Rev. Psicol., Organ. Trab

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This paper aims to discuss explanatory models in Work and Organizational Psychology by analyzing their metatheoretical underpinnings. In particular, the paper analyzes the concepts of causes and reasons, both of which perform a central role in the constitution of scientific models. We demonstrate that experimental, correlational, and case study explanatory models use causes and reasons as strategies of knowledge building, and as a means of linking phenomenon, data, and theory. We also discuss the methodological implications of such use of causes and reasons by scientific models. The paper concludes by discussing theoretical and methodological issues involved in the attempts at building complex models in WOP -showing that, in order to be complex, a model needs to include in its formulation stable-dynamic, cause-reason, and contextual distance-proximity analyses, as well as the theory-phenomenon-data triad. Modelos explicativos de fenômenos em POT: Aspectos epistemológicos, teóricos e metodológicosResumo Este artigo tem como objetivo discutir modelos explicativos em Psicologia Organizacional e do Trabalho tendo, como pano de fundo, uma análise das bases metateóricas que os sustentam epistemologicamente. Em particular, analisam-se os conceitos de causas e razões, ambos centrais na composição desses modelos. Demonstramos que os modelos explicativos experimentais, correlacionais e os estudos de caso utilizam-se distintamente de causas e razões em suas estratégias de construção do conhecimento e de articulação entre dados, fenômeno e teoria, e que essa utilização tem implicações no nível metodológico. Finaliza-se problematizando aspectos teórico-metodológicos envolvidos na construção de modelos mais complexos em POT, que levem em conta a análise das dimensões estável-dinâmico, causa-razão e distanciamento-proximidade do contexto, e a tríade teoria-fenômeno-dado. Modelos explicativos de fenómenos en POT: Aspectos epistemológicos, teóricos y metodológicosResumen Este artículo tiene como objetivo discutir modelos explicativos en Psicología Organizacional al y del Trabajo, teniendo como trasfondo un análisis de las bases metateóricas que los sostienen epistemológicamente. En concreto, se analizan los conceptos de causas y razones, ambos centrales en la formación de dichos modelos. Demostramos que tanto los modelos explicativos experimentales, como los correlacionales y los estudios de caso utilizan, indistintamente, causas y razones en sus estrategias de construcción del conocimiento y de articulación de datos, fenómenos y teoría, y que tal utilización tiene implicaciones en el nivel metodológico. Finalmente, se problematizan aspectos teórico-metodológicos implicados en la construcción de modelos más complejos en POT, que tengan en cuenta el análisis de las dimensiones estable-dinámico, causa-razón, y distanciamiento-proximidad del contexto, así como la tríada teoría-fenómeno-dato.

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On the meaning and the epistemological relevance of the notion of a scientific phenomenon

Cited by 13 publications

References 18 publications

Reconsidering theoretical naïveté in psychological qualitative research

Reconsidering theoretical naïveté in psychological qualitative research

Theories and models: What they are, what they are for, and what they are about

Explanatory models for work and organizational phenomena: Epistemological, theoretical, and methodological issues

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