On the modeling and analysis of obligations

Irwin, Keith; Yu, Ting; Winsborough, William H.

doi:10.1145/1180405.1180423

Cited by 88 publications

(79 citation statements)

References 35 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…We also would like to extend our models to include user obligations [12], and use the idea of "charging for risk" to enforce those obligations. The risk charge is removed from the user's "risk account" if the user fulfils the obligation.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk-Aware Role-Based Access Control

Chen

Crampton

2012

Security and Trust Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. The increasing need to share information in dynamic environments has created a requirement for risk-aware access control systems. The standard RBAC model is designed to operate in a relatively stable, closed environment and does not include any support for risk. In this paper, we explore a number of ways in which the RBAC model can be extended to incorporate notions of risk. In particular, we develop three simple risk-aware RBAC models that differ in the way in which risk is represented and accounted for in making access control decisions. We also propose a risk-aware RBAC model that combines all the features of three simple models and consider some issues related to its implementation. Compared with existing work, our models have clear authorization semantics and support richer types of access control decisions.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk-Aware Role-Based Access Control

Chen

Crampton

2012

Security and Trust Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Traditional security policies largely focus on the specification and management of access control requirement [3], [9], however the availability of services in many applications often further requires obligation requirements (see for example in [5]). The questions of how to understand the interactions between access control policies and obligation polices, and how to integrate and compose policies to enforce consistency in a policy-based system, have not yet been adequately investigated.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Algebra for Integration and Analysis of Ponder2 Policies

Zhao

Lobo

Bellovin

2008

2008 IEEE Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-Traditional policies often focus on access control requirement and there have been several proposals to define access control policy algebras to handle compositions and interactions. Recently, obligations are increasingly being expressed as part of security policies. However, their compositions and interactions have not yet been studied adequately. In this paper, we propose a policy algebra capturing both access control and obligation policies. The algebra consists of two policy constants and six basic operations. It provides language independent mechanisms to manage policies. As a concrete example, we instantiate the algebra for the Ponder2 policy language.

show abstract

“…Any concrete model instantiates one or more of its features. This metamodel was first presented in [9] and more detail can be found there.…”

Section: Metamodelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [9], we propose a concept we call accountability as a more satisfactory obligation-security notion. Intuitively, if all users will have sufficient privileges and resource to carry out their obligations provided every other user diligently carries out his or her obligations (and no other actions are performed), then we say the system is in an accountable state.…”

Section: Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Assigning Responsibility for Failed Obligations

Irwin

Winsborough

IFIP – The International Federation for Information Processing

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Traditional security policies largely focus on access control. Though essential, access control is only one aspect of security. In particular, the correct behavior and reliable operation of a system depends not only on what users are permitted to do, but oftentimes on what users are required to do. Such obligatory actions are integral to the security procedures of many enterprises. Unlike access control, obligations assigned to individual users are often unenforceable, that is, the system cannot ensure that each obligation will be fulfilled. Accurately determining who was at fault when obligations are not met is essential for responding appropriately, be it in terms of modified trust relationships or other recourse. In this paper, based on a formal metamodel of obligations, we propose an approach for fault assessment through active online tracking of responsibilities and dependencies between obligations. We identify and formalize two key properties for the correct assessment of fault, and design responsibility assignment and fault assessment algorithms for a concrete yet general access control and obligation system.

show abstract

On the modeling and analysis of obligations

Cited by 88 publications

References 35 publications

Risk-Aware Role-Based Access Control

Risk-Aware Role-Based Access Control

An Algebra for Integration and Analysis of Ponder2 Policies

Assigning Responsibility for Failed Obligations

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About