On the Modeling of Automotive Security: A Survey of Methods and Perspectives

Abstract

As the intelligent car-networking represents the new direction of the future vehicular development, automotive security plays an increasingly important role in the whole car industry chain. On condition that the accompanying problems of security are proofed, vehicles will provide more convenience while ensuring safety. Security models can be utilized as tools to rationalize the security of the automotive system and represent it in a structured manner. It is essential to improve the knowledge about security models by comparing them besides proposing new methods. This paper aims to give a comprehensive introduction to the topic of security models for the Intelligent Transport System (ITS). A survey of the current methodologies for security modeling is conducted and a classification scheme is subsequently proposed. Furthermore, the existing framework and methods to build automotive security models are broadly examined according to the features of automotive electronic system. A number of fundamental aspects are defined to compare the presented methods in order to comprehend the automotive security modeling in depth.

An Integrated Approach of Threat Analysis for Autonomous Vehicles Perception System

“…Threat models for the previous generation of the automotive industry are targeted for automotive E/E architecture, which are either adapted from IT and software industry (e.g., Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege (STRIDE) [34], confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) [35] threat, vulnerability and risk assessment (TVRA) [36], E-safety vehicle intrusion protected applications (EVITA) [37], and healing vulnerabilities to enhance software security and safety (HEAVENS)) [24] or heavily influenced by safety analysis models such as fault tree analysis, Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (e.g., security-aware hazard analysis and risk assessment (SAHARA)) [38]. In 2021, the ISO/SAE 21434 standard was published for Road Vehicles-Cybersecurity Engineering, which included EVITA, HEAV-ENS, and TVRA in recommendations for automotive threat modeling.…”

Towards a security‐driven automotive development lifecycle

“…However, STRIDE can also be used for CPS analysis and development due to its generic and modular nature. STRIDE-specific threat modeling methods and approaches, also in the context of CPS development, are discussed in previous studies, for example, 29,31,43,45 and previous works 21,24,34,41,44,46,47 compare aspects and characteristics of various threat modeling approaches and methods.…”

Threat Assessment and Risk Analysis (TARA) for Interoperable Medical Devices in the Operating Room Inspired by the Automotive Industry

“…In this context, further methods exist. The STRIDE model (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privilege) is a qualitative approach by Microsoft using a system’s DFD as the base for an evaluation [ 35 ]. Security-related system properties are labeled and checked regarding security characteristics, and threats are identified.…”

“…HEAVENS includes authenticity, authorization, non-repudiation, privacy, and freshness, on top of the previously mentioned attributes. It evaluates the whole E/E architecture and provides a risk matrix as a result that includes threat as well as impact levels, but also high-level security requirements [ 35 ]. The extension HEAVENS 2.0 is improved according to gaps that could be identified when comparing HEAVENS 1.0 to the requirements of ISO/SAE 21434.…”

“…Based on that, the framework is used to perform a threat and risk analysis in a joint process. The output of the model execution is a risk matrix accompanied by security requirements and methods [ 35 ].…”