On the nature and systematic role of evidence: Husserl as a proponent of mentalist evidentialism?

Abstract

In this paper, I shall show that for Husserl, (a) evidence determines epistemic justification and (b) evidence is linked to originary givenness in the sense that one's ultimate evidence consists of one's originary presentive intuitions. This means that in contemporary analytic terminology, Husserl is a proponent of evidentialism and mentalism. Evidentialism and mentalism have been introduced into current debates by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Finally, I shall highlight that there is one significant difference between Husserl and Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Although Conee and Feldman argue that the fundamental principles of epistemology are principles of best explanation, Husserl opts for phenomenological principles as the most fundamental epistemic principles. The main difference is that for Husserl, experiences gain their justificatory force by virtue of their phenomenal character, namely, their originary givenness.

From phenomenological-hermeneutical approaches to realist perspectivism

“…27 perceptual experiences can provide some prima facie evidence, but this evidence is falsified by other pieces of evidence. A piece of evidence may be mistaken, and thus evidence is fallible (see Berghofer 2019). Other pieces of evidence can falsify a piece of mistaken evidence.…”