On the normative insignificance of neuroscience and dual-process theory

Königs, Peter

doi:10.1007/s12152-018-9362-y

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Some rejected the idea that empirical findings could inform ethics. Others argued that, even if it is possible to bridge the divide between science and philosophy, the normative upshot is quite different from Greene's conclusions (Allman & Woodward, 2008;Berker, 2009;Bruni et al, 2013;Dale, 2020;Dean, 2010;Heinzelmann, 2018;Königs, 2018;Kumar & Campbell, 2012;Paulo, 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Brains, trains, and ethical claims: Reassessing the normative implications of moral dilemma research

Dale

Gawronski

2022

Philosophical Psychology

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Joshua Greene has argued that the empirical findings of cognitive science have implications for ethics. In particular, he has argued (1) that people's deontological judgments in response to trolley problems are strongly influenced by at least one morally irrelevant factor, personal force, and are therefore at least somewhat unreliable, and (2) that we ought to trust our consequentialist judgments more than our deontological judgments when making decisions about unfamiliar moral problems. While many cognitive scientists have rejected Greene's dual-process theory of moral judgment on empirical grounds, philosophers have mostly taken issue with his normative assertions. For the most part, these two discussions have occurred separately. The current analysis aims to remedy this situation by philosophically analyzing the implications of moral dilemma research using the CNI model of moral decision-making -a formalized, mathematical model that decomposes three distinct aspects of moral-dilemma judgments. In particular, we show how research guided by the CNI model reveals significant conceptual, empirical, and theoretical problems with Greene's dual-process theory, thereby questioning the foundations of his normative conclusions.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Brains, trains, and ethical claims: Reassessing the normative implications of moral dilemma research

Dale

Gawronski

2022

Philosophical Psychology

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“…Unlike Haidt (2012), Greene (2013) suggested several prescriptive guidelines underscoring the roles of reasoning, instead of intuition, in conflict solving based on the dual process model based on neuroimaging evidence. Of course, there have been critiques to the validity of Greene's (2009Greene's ( , 2013 accounts raised by moral philosophers (e.g., Königs, 2018). Despite the criticisms, at least, we may acknowledge potential values of neuroimaging works in consideration of prescriptive and practical solutions to address issues associated with conflicts between values in the highly diversified modern society.…”

Section: Potential Contributions Of Neuroscientific Studies To Research On Public Valuementioning

confidence: 99%

Public Value, Psychology, and Neuroscience

Han¹

2021

Korea Assoc Public Value

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Research on public value is inevitably interdisciplinary in its nature due to its aim and purpose. Both philosophical and empirical approaches are necessary to conduct such research in a successful manner. In the present paper, I intend to discuss the importance of empirical approaches in research on public values, particularly psychological and neuroscientific approaches, with concrete examples. I proposed that such empirical approaches are essential in better understanding the processes and mechanisms associated with how people address issues associated with public value in the modern society. Also, I overviewed how the psychological and neuroscientific approaches contribute to practical aspects related to public value, such as policy making and education. Based on the aforementioned points, I briefly discussed directions for future research in research on public value as an interdisciplinary field.

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“…This potential problem hangs over Greene's entire argument, but as my critique lies elsewhere, I will not be discussing it in this article. See Königs (2018) and Paulo (2018) for further discussion. 13.…”

Section: P2mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is merely connecting the dots in an attempt to give the most charitable reading to Greene's notion of unfamiliarity*. Königs (2018) was the first to make this connection. 29.…”

Section: P2mentioning

confidence: 99%

Neurons and normativity: A critique of Greene’s notion of unfamiliarity

Dale

2020

Philosophical Psychology

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In his article "Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality," Joshua Greene argues that the empirical findings of cognitive neuroscience have implications for ethics. Specifically, he contends that we ought to trust our manual conscious reasoning system more than our automatic emotional system when confronting unfamiliar problems; and because cognitive neuroscience has shown that consequentialist judgments are generated by the manual system and deontological judgments are generated by the automatic system, we ought to trust the former more than the latter when facing unfamiliar moral problems. In the present article, I analyze one of the premises of Greene's argument. In particular, I ask what exactly an unfamiliar problem is, and whether moral problems can be classified as unfamiliar. After exploring several different possible interpretations of familiarity and unfamiliarity, I conclude that the concepts are too problematic to be philosophically compelling and, thus, should be abandoned.

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On the normative insignificance of neuroscience and dual-process theory

Cited by 8 publications

References 37 publications

Brains, trains, and ethical claims: Reassessing the normative implications of moral dilemma research

Brains, trains, and ethical claims: Reassessing the normative implications of moral dilemma research

Public Value, Psychology, and Neuroscience

Neurons and normativity: A critique of Greene’s notion of unfamiliarity

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