On the Numerical Solution of Equilibria in Auction Models with Asymmetries within the Private-Values Paradigm

Hubbard, Timothy P.; Paarsch, Harry J.

doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-52980-0.00002-5

Cited by 28 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…Also, a supplier with logistics facilities in a given area may find some increasing returns-to-scale in awarding several units in the auction. Such asymmetries among bidders create the conditions for what the literature refers as asymmetric auctions (Hubbard and Paarsch 2014;Maskin and Riley 2000).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An asymmetric multi-item auction with quantity discounts applied to Internet service procurement in Buenos Aires public schools

et al. 2016

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This article studies a multi-item auction characterized by asymmetric bidders and quantity discounts. We report a practical application of this type of auction in the procurement of Internet services to the 709 public schools of Buenos Aires. The asymmetry in this application is due to firms' existing technology infrastructures, which affect their ability to provide the service in certain areas of the city. A single round first-price sealed-bid auction, it required each participating firm to bid a supply curve specifying a price on predetermined graduated quantity intervals and to identify the individual schools it would supply. The maximal intersections of the sets of schools each participant has bid on define regions we call competition units. A single unit price must be quoted for all schools supplied within the same quantity interval, so that firms cannot bid a high price where competition is weak and a lower one where it is strong. Quantity discounts are allowed so that the bids can reflect returns-to-scale of the suppliers and the auctioneer may benefit of awarding bundles of units instead of separate units. The winner determination problem in this auction poses a challenge to the auctioneer. We present an exponential formulation and a polynomial formulation for this problem, both based on integer linear programming. The polynomial formulation proves to find the optimal set of bids in a matter of seconds. Results of the real-world implementation are reported. B G. Durán

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An asymmetric multi-item auction with quantity discounts applied to Internet service procurement in Buenos Aires public schools

et al. 2016

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“…Furthermore, similarly to the original bidding problem, the closed-form solution exists only in a limited number of special cases [9], [12]. However, as presented by Hubbard and Paarsch [9], there exist well-defined numerical methods which can be used to solve it.…”

Section: Auction With Common Priormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Due to the nature of the problem, however, the algorithms handle only a subset of all cases such that the lower boundary condition (4) is reduced toĉ i (b) =ĉ i . It is the purpose of this paper to address this deficiency by casting the bidding problem into a simpler setting of common prior (CP) for which there exists a plethora of numerical solutions that are well-researched and well-defined [9].…”

Section: Bidding Problem In the Digital Marketplacementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In an auction with common prior, the range the costs can vary is the same for each bidder, and for this type of auctions, there exists a plethora of well-studied numerical algorithms that can be used to approximate the equilibrium of the auction. Consequently, we propose an approximation to the equilibrium of the DMP through the use of an auction with common prior [9]. Our solution yields results of acceptable quality, with the approximation error never exceeding 16%, and importantly, decreasing with the increasing number of network operators.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Approximating Equilibrium in the Digital Marketplace

Konka¹,

Michie²,

Andonović³

et al. 2015

2015 IEEE 81st Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC Spring)

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This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/51403/ Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University of Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: strathprints@strath.ac.ukThe Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output. Approximating Equilibrium in the Digital MarketplaceJakub Konka, Craig Michie, Ivan Andonovic, and Robert Atkinson Centre for Intelligent Dynamic Communications University of Strathclyde Glasgow G1 1XW, UK Email: {jakub.konka, c.michie, i.andonovic, robert.atkinson}@strath.ac.uk, Abstract-Digital Marketplace is a market-based framework for trading mobile communications services at a service level. It is well suited for managing a future mobile communications environment where the one-to-one mapping between network operators and subscribers no longer holds, and the subscribers are given the option to select a network operator and a wireless access technology that matches their preferences best at a service level. As with any market-based framework, it is important to analyse the selling mechanism from the economic perspective. In this paper, we address the deficiencies of previous research on the economic equilibrium of the Digital Marketplace. We achieve this by proposing an approximation to the equilibrium of the Digital Marketplace through the use of an auction with common prior.

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“…In other words, the outcomes at sealed, pay-yourbid and oral, descending-price auctions can be inefficient. In general, however, except by using the numerical methods described in Timothy P. Hubbard and Paarsch [2014], few predictions concerning the expected-revenue ranking of the different auction formats and pricing rules exist, which makes structural econometric empirical work especially important.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%