On the Ontological Status of Plans and Norms

Abstract

Abstract. This article describes an ontological model of norms. The basic assumption is that a substantial part of a legal system is grounded on the concept of agency. Since a legal system aims at regulating a society, then its goal can be achieved only by affecting the behaviour of the members of the society. We assume that a society is made up of agents (which can be individuals, institutions, software programs, etc.), that agents have beliefs, goals and preferences, and that they commit to intentions in order to choose a line of behaviour. The role of norms, within a legal system, is to specify how and when the chosen behaviour agrees with the basic principles of the legal system. In this article, we show how a model based on plans can be the basis for the ontological representation of norms, which are expressed as constraints on the possible plans an agent may choose to guide its behaviour. Moreover, the paper describes how the proposed model can be linked to the upper level of a philosophically well-founded ontology (DOLCE); in this way, the model is set in a wider perspective, which opens the way to further developments.

The Desirability of Legal Rights for Novel Beings

“…It has been noted that most people, when confronted with the problem, believe that nonhuman biological persons are of equal moral worth to ourselves 34 and equally reject the bio-centrism of debates around moral patiency. 35 We can therefore confirm the claim of Guido Boella et al that there is no reason why artificial agents should not be seen as full members of the ontological community, 36 provided they be moral patients as identified by the PGC. We can assume, following Ugo Pagallo et al that technological advancements will make this question of moral patiency of novel beings more relevant 37 -and Gewirth provides the tool by which this normative issue can be addressed.…”

Towards a Conceptualization of Sociomaterial Entanglement

“…Thus, by axiom 3, customer is in the social module. 2 Therefore, the particulars in the ontology can be simply classified according to their module. 3…”