On the optimality and practicability of mutual information analysis in some scenarios

Chérisey, Éloi de; Guilley, Sylvain; Heuser, Annelie; Rioul, Olivier

doi:10.1007/s12095-017-0241-x

Cited by 15 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…When the templates (Ỹ , Σ ) are obtained from Alg. 1, then the attack is no longer optimal [15], but is termed template attack. However, template attacks tend to optimal attack when the profiling is carried out on a number of traces which tends to infinity.…”

Section: Profiling and Attack Algorithmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the power of template attacks in highly multivariate context

et al. 2020

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When implemented in software (or hardware), a cryptographic protocol can leak sensitive information during its execution. Side-channel attacks can use those leakages in order to reveal some information about the secret used by the algorithm. The leaking side-channel information can take place in many time samples. Measurement appliances can cope with the acquisition of multiple samples. From an adversarial point of view, it is therefore beneficial to attempt to make the most of highly multivariate traces. On the one hand, template attacks have been introduced to deal with multivariate leakages, with as few assumptions as possible on the leakage model. On the other hand, many works have underlined the need for dimensionality reduction. In this paper, we clarify the relationship between template attacks in full space and in linear subspaces, in terms of success rate. In particular, we exhibit a clear mathematical expression for template attacks, which enables an efficient computation even on large dimensions such as several hundred of samples. It is noteworthy that both of PoI-based and PCA

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Section: Profiling and Attack Algorithmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the power of template attacks in highly multivariate context

et al. 2020

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“…Moreover, in the case of multicore systems, it will become hard to attribute such portion of code to that process (including the one under attack). Maybe side-channel analysis techniques can tolerate these experimental drawbacks (see for instance [6]). But we expect that more genericity will come with a price on the efficiency side.…”

Section: "Architecture and Advanced Design Solutions" Factormentioning

confidence: 99%

Impacts of Technology Trends on Physical Attacks?

Maurine

Guilley

2017

Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design

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Chip fabrication technologies evolve at an explosive rate. Notwithstanding, we analyze that attacks on smartcard chips are almost not impacted: only the architecture which gets more complex (e.g., the devices transition from mono-to multi-core) and the advanced design solutions (adaptative voltage and frequency scaling, multiple clock domains, asynchronicity, etc.) somehow make attacks slightly more complex. The situation is different for chips tightly integrated in embedded devices, such as smartphone chips. Indeed, the chips size and complexity increase drastically, and thus attacks identification phase becomes extremely hard. In addition, the chip targetted by the attacks is usually stacked with other chips (like the memory), which makes access to leakages and injection of faults a challenging task. Therefore, we conclude that there is a clear gain of security in the future to use smartphones as secure elements. Attacks at printed circuit board level associated with signal processing and machine learning could question this conclusion. Also, as a perspective, we notice that new kinds of attacks become possible on smartphones. Those devices being intrinsically connected, the new side-channel and fault injection attacks are realized not physically, but in software (controlled from an external center attack process): such attacks are called microarchitectural cache timing attacks (regarding side-channels) and RowHammer attacks (regarding fault injections). We predict increasing progress in those cyberattack threats.

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“…The comparison between those methods is the topic of several papers, such as [GLRP06, SKM + 13] for the 2nd vs. 3rd methods, or [dCGHR18] for the 1st vs. 2nd methods.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Side-Channel Expectation-Maximization Attacks

Béguinot

Cheng

Guilley

et al. 2022

TCHES

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Block ciphers are protected against side-channel attacks by masking. On one hand, when the leakage model is unknown, second-order correlation attacks are typically used. On the other hand, when the leakage model can be profiled, template attacks are prescribed. But what if the profiled model does not exactly match that of the attacked device?One solution consists in regressing on-the-fly the scaling parameters from the model. In this paper, we leverage an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm to implement such an attack. The resulting unprofiled EM attack, termed U-EM, is shown to be both efficient (in terms of number of traces) and effective (computationally speaking). Based on synthetic and real traces, we introduce variants of our U-EM attack to optimize its performance, depending on trade-offs between model complexity and epistemic noise. We show that the approach is flexible, in that it can easily be adapted to refinements such as different points of interest and number of parameters in the leakage model.

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On the optimality and practicability of mutual information analysis in some scenarios

Cited by 15 publications

References 22 publications

On the power of template attacks in highly multivariate context

On the power of template attacks in highly multivariate context

Impacts of Technology Trends on Physical Attacks?

Side-Channel Expectation-Maximization Attacks

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