On the optimality of IPR protection with blocking patents

Yang, Yibai

doi:10.1016/j.red.2017.07.002

Cited by 30 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…In this model, labor is used as a factor input for the production of final good. Final good is used for consumption and as a factor input for entry, in-house R&D, and 6 See e.g., Cozzi (2001), Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), O'Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004), Furukawa (2007), Chu (2009), Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012), Iwaisako and Futagami (2013), Cozzi and Galli (2014), Huang et al (2017) and Yang (2018). 7 See also Galor and Moav (2002), Weisdorf (2004), Galor and Mountford (2008), Ashraf and Galor (2011), Galor (2011) and Desmet and Parente (2012).…”

Section: A Schumpeterian Model Of Endogenous Take-offmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of patents on the transition from stagnation to growth

2019

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This study provides a growth-theoretic analysis of the effects of intellectual property rights on the takeoff of an economy from an era of stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth. We incorporate patent protection into a Schumpeterian growth model in which takeoff occurs when the population size crosses an endogenous threshold. We find that strengthening patent protection has contrasting effects on economic growth at different stages of development. Specifically, it leads to an earlier takeoff but also reduces economic growth in the long run. Keywords Intellectual property rights • Endogenous takeoff • Innovation • Economic growth JEL Classification O31 • O34 "England [...] by 1700 [...] had developed an efficient set of property rights embedded in the common law [and...] begun to protect private property in knowledge with its patent law. The stage was now set for the industrial revolution." North and Thomas (1973, p. 156

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Section: A Schumpeterian Model Of Endogenous Take-offmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of patents on the transition from stagnation to growth

2019

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“…Furthermore, we compare the effects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies and find that in a Schumpeterian growth model with EMS, the long‐run effects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies are drastically different suggesting the importance of taking into consideration the endogeneity of market structure when performing policy analysis in R&D‐based growth models. O'Donoghue and Zweimuller (), Horii and Iwaisako (), Furukawa (), Chu (), Chu, Cozzi, and Galli (), Chu and Pan (), and Yang () also find that increasing the strength of other patent policy levers, such as blocking patents and patentability requirement, could have negative effects on economic growth. Acemoglu and Akcigit () consider the interesting case of state‐dependent patent length and show that full patent protection does not maximize economic growth.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Patents, R&D subsidies, and endogenous market structure in a schumpeterian economy

Chu

Furukawa

2016

Southern Economic Journal

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This study explores the di¤erent implications of patent breadth and R&D subsidies on economic growth and endogenous market structure in a Schumpeterian growth model. We …nd that when the number of …rms is …xed in the short run, patent breadth and R&D subsidies serve to increase economic growth as in previous studies. However, when the number of …rms adjusts endogenously in the long run, R&D subsidies increase economic growth but decrease the number of …rms, whereas patent breadth expands the number of …rms but reduces economic growth. Therefore, R&D subsidy is perhaps a more suitable policy instrument than patent breadth for the purpose of stimulating long-run economic growth.JEL classi…cation: O30, O40

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“…Using (32) and (35) yields the ratio of production labor to leisure L x /(1 − L) = α(1 − γ )/(θμ). This implies that when an elastic labor supply is incorporated, patent protection creates a distortion on the allocation between production and leisure, such that a higher μ decreases L x /(1 − L); 19 this impact of patent breadth on the ratio of manufacturing labor to leisure is consistent with that in Yang (2018). Moreover, the levels of labor allocations in production, R&D, and capital-producing in this case (i.e., (32)-(34)) are lower than their counterparts in the baseline model (i.e., (21)-(23)).…”

Section: Elastic Labor Supplymentioning

confidence: 55%

WELFARE EFFECTS OF PATENT PROTECTION IN A GROWTH MODEL WITH R&D AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

Yang

2019

Macroecon. Dynam.

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This study explores the welfare effects of patent protection in a Romer-type expanding variety model in which R&D and capital accumulation are both engines of growth. It shows that the comparison between the productivity of R&D and that of capital plays an important role in the welfare analysis. When the relative productivity of R&D compared to capital is high (low), social welfare takes an inverted-U shape for (is decreasing in) the strength of patent protection, and the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection is no greater than (identical to) the growth-maximizing degree. Moreover, the model is calibrated to the US economy and the numerical results support these welfare implications.

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On the optimality of IPR protection with blocking patents

Cited by 30 publications

References 49 publications

Effects of patents on the transition from stagnation to growth

Effects of patents on the transition from stagnation to growth

Patents, R&D subsidies, and endogenous market structure in a schumpeterian economy

WELFARE EFFECTS OF PATENT PROTECTION IN A GROWTH MODEL WITH R&D AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

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