On the (Political) Origin of ‘Corporate Governance’ Species

Abstract

Although economies, business practices, and living standards have converged since WWII, corporate structures continue to differ among the advanced economies of the world. Looking at the diversity of corporate structures of large-sized firms around the world (and over time) would fascinate Charles Darwin. This work develops a critical review of the literature on political determinants of corporate governance through the Darwinian theory (including some Lamarckian aspects). As Darwin, in his work On the Origin of Species, explicates the diversity of species of tortoises, finches, and iguanas of the Galapagos Islands, so Darwinism may contribute in understanding the origin and the persistence of corporate diversity. In particular, this article takes into account politics-driven variations, their inheritances, and the subsequent selection of advantageous 'corporate' attributes.JEL Code: G30, K22, J50

The business model as a generative replicator

“…The industrial environment concerns the specificities of the sectors and their actors as well as the business-political environment. As Vatiero (2017) reminds us, in business firm analysis, we have to take into account politics-driven variations, inheritance and so the selection of corporate attributes (see also the evolutionary perspective of Roe, 1996). From a complementary point of view, Pagano (2012: 1272) considers that ‘the advent of the new organizational species [...] require[s] a complex political process’.…”

Learning from the Swiss Corporate Governance Exception

“…The main lesson to be learned from the Swiss case is that politics matters in the evolution of corporate governance and that institutional complementarities may constitute a hereditary mechanism that explains institutional diversities (cf. Aoki, ; Pagano and Vatiero, ; Vatiero, ). Institutional complementary theory suggests that various elements can consistently complement each other to form path‐dependent economic outcomes within broader institutional contexts (see also Pagano and Vatiero, ).…”