On the Possibility of Non-interactive E-Voting in the Public-Key Setting

Giustolisi, Rosario; Iovino, Vincenzo; Rønne, Peter B.

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_13

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Szepieniec and Bart [24] proposed a protocol similar to Kiayias and Yung that also provides fairness. Giustolisi et al [25] showed how to reuse the key-sharing round in Hao et al, reducing the number of rounds to one in all subsequent elections. Adding a commitment round to Hao et al, Khader et al [5] achieve fairness, and, by introducing a recovery round, they achieve robustness (Section VI-F).…”

Section: A Self-tallying Boardroom Voting Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

BVOT: Self-Tallying Boardroom Voting with Oblivious Transfer

Javani¹,

Sherman²

2020

Preprint

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A boardroom election is an election with a small number of voters carried out with public communications. We present BVOT, a self-tallying boardroom voting protocol with ballot secrecy, fairness (no tally information is available before the polls close), and dispute-freeness (voters can observe that all voters correctly followed the protocol).BVOT works by using a multiparty threshold homomorphic encryption system in which each candidate is associated with a masked unique prime. Each voter engages in an oblivious transfer with an untrusted distributor: the voter selects the index of a prime associated with a candidate and receives the selected prime in masked form. The voter then casts their vote by encrypting their masked prime and broadcasting it to everyone. The distributor does not learn the voter's choice, and no one learns the mapping between primes and candidates until the audit phase. By hiding the mapping between primes and candidates, BVOT provides voters with insufficient information to carry out effective cheating. The threshold feature prevents anyone from computing any partial tally-until everyone has voted. Multiplying all votes, their decryption shares, and the unmasking factor yields a product of the primes each raised to the number of votes received.In contrast to some existing boardroom voting protocols, BVOT does not rely on any zero-knowledge proof; instead, it uses oblivious transfer to assure ballot secrecy and correct vote casting. Also, BVOT can handle multiple candidates in one election. BVOT prevents cheating by hiding crucial information: an attempt to increase the tally of one candidate might increase the tally of another candidate. After all votes are cast, any party can tally the votes.

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Section: A Self-tallying Boardroom Voting Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

BVOT: Self-Tallying Boardroom Voting with Oblivious Transfer

Javani¹,

Sherman²

2020

Preprint

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“…We point out that our definition of verifiability is motivated by the guidelines of [CGK + 16]. In its formalization, our definition is similar to the ones of [GIR16], the verifiability for multi-input functional encryption of BGJS and the uniqueness of tally of Bernhard et al [BCG + 15]. Anyhow, the latter is formulated to hold only against computationally bounded adversaries and both BGJS16 and Bernhard et al do not take into account our condition (2) for verifiability.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

(Universal) Unconditional Verifiability in E-Voting without Trusted Parties

Gallegos-Garcia¹,

Iovino²,

Rial³

et al. 2016

Preprint

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In e-voting protocol design, cryptographers must balance usability and strong security guarantees, such as privacy and verifiability.In traditional e-voting protocols, privacy is often provided by a trusted authority that learns the votes and computes the tally. Some protocols replace the trusted authority by a set of authorities, and privacy is guaranteed if less than a threshold number of authorities are corrupt. For verifiability, stronger security guarantees are demanded. Typically, corrupt authorities that try to fake the result of the tally must always be detected.To provide verifiability, many e-voting protocols use Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge proofs (NIZKs). Thanks to their non-interactive nature, NIZKs allow anybody, including third parties that do not participate in the protocol, to verify the correctness of the tally. Therefore, NIZKs can be used to obtain universal verifiability. Additionally, NIZKs also improve usability because they allow voters to cast a vote using a non-interactive protocol. The disadvantage of NIZKs is that their security is based on setup assumptions such as the common reference string (CRS) or the random oracle (RO) model. The former requires a trusted party for the generation of a common reference string. The latter, though a popular methodology for designing secure protocols, has been shown to be unsound. In this paper, we address the design of an e-voting protocol that provides verifiability without any trust assumptions, where verifiability here is meant without eligibility verification. We show that Non-Interactive Witness-Indistinguishable proofs (NIWI) can be used for this purpose. The e-voting scheme is private under the Decision Linear assumption, while verifiability holds unconditionally. To our knowledge, this is the first private e-voting scheme with perfect universal verifiability, i.e. one in which the probability of a fake tally not being detected is 0, and with non-interactive protocols that does not rely on trust assumptions.

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“…In such decentralised schemes, the election is an interactive protocol between the voters only and it can even be made oneround, i.e. non-interactive, in a public key setting [7]. Whether a centralised or decentralised protocol is better-suited to a given situation depends on practical and context-specific concerns such as whether the trusted authority assumption makes sense.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However this does not guarantee that there are no fallouts in the recovery round. In [7] it was shown that using a bilinear group setting and assuming a public key infrastructure, the voting protocol can be made noninteractive, i.e. one-round.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Time, Privacy, Robustness, Accuracy: Trade-Offs for the Open Vote Network Protocol

et al. 2022

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The open vote network ( [10]) is a secure two-round multi-party protocol facilitating the computation of a sum of integer votes without revealing their individual values. This is done without a central authority trusted for privacy, and thus allows decentralised and anonymous decision-making efficiently. As such, it has also been implemented in other settings such as financial applications, see e.g. [15, 17].An inherent limitation of is its lack of robustness against denial-of-service attacks, which occur when at least one of the voters participates in the first round of the protocol but (maliciously or accidentally) not in the second. Unfortunately, such a situation is likely to occur in any real-world implementation of the protocol with many participants. This could incur serious time delays from either waiting for the failing parties and perhaps having to perform extra protocol rounds with the remaining participants.This paper provides a solution to this problem by extending with mechanisms tolerating a number of unresponsive participants, the basic idea being to run several sub-elections in parallel. The price to pay is a carefully controlled privacy loss, an increase in computation, and a statistical loss in accuracy, which we demonstrate how to measure precisely.

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On the Possibility of Non-interactive E-Voting in the Public-Key Setting

Cited by 9 publications

References 20 publications

BVOT: Self-Tallying Boardroom Voting with Oblivious Transfer

BVOT: Self-Tallying Boardroom Voting with Oblivious Transfer

(Universal) Unconditional Verifiability in E-Voting without Trusted Parties

Time, Privacy, Robustness, Accuracy: Trade-Offs for the Open Vote Network Protocol

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