On the practical importance of communication complexity for secure multi-party computation protocols

Kerschbaum, Florian; Dahlmeier, Daniel; Schröpfer, Axel; Biswas, Debmalya

doi:10.1145/1529282.1529730

Cited by 28 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…As mentioned before SC protocols can be very computational intensive [22] challenging the performance of a single CPU. In some cases [6], [14] it is already known that SC protocols can be quite efficiently parallelized capitalizing on the trend to multi-core CPUs.…”

Section: ) Parallel Executionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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L1 - An Intermediate Language for Mixed-Protocol Secure Computation

Schröpfer¹,

Kerschbaum²,

Müller

2011

2011 IEEE 35th Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference

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Abstract-Secure Computation (SC) enables secure distributed computation of arbitrary functions of private inputs. It has many useful applications, e.g. benchmarking or auctions. Several general protocols for SC have been proposed and recently been implemented in a number of compilers and frameworks. These compilers or frameworks implement one general SC protocol and then require the programmer to implement the function he wants the protocol to compute.Performance remains a challenge for this approach and it has been realized early on that special protocols for important problems can deliver superior performance.In this paper we propose a new intermediate language (L1) for optimizing SC compilers which enables efficient implementation of special protocols potentially mixing several general SC protocols.We show by three case studies -one for computation of the median, one for weighted average, one for division -that special protocols and mixed-protocol implementations in our language L1 can lead to superior performance. Moreover, we show that only a combined view on algorithm and cryptographic protocol can discover SCs with best run-time performance.

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Section: ) Parallel Executionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Even optimized protocols report a slowdown of several tens of thousand compared to non-privacy-preserving implementation [22]. It has been realized early on that special protocols for important problems can provide better performance [18].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

L1 - An Intermediate Language for Mixed-Protocol Secure Computation

Schröpfer¹,

Kerschbaum²,

Müller

2011

2011 IEEE 35th Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference

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“…This enables building an enterprise information system over the SMC protocol. Finally we implemented the protocols over web services [18]. The interesting result is that the protocols can be implemented, such that communication cost is negligible.…”

Section: Other Scenariosmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We have done so [18], but the implementation costs in terms of memory and performance are huge [14]. Given that no other benefits of web services, such as late binding, can be used, the penalty can be prohibitive.…”

Section: Web Services As Transportationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security against the business partner

Kerschbaum¹,

Deitos²

2008

Proceedings of the 2008 ACM Workshop on Secure Web Services

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Security research has long focused on protecting against outside attackers. This was augmented with protection against insider threats, but recently networked business is emerging. With it a new threat is emerging: security against the business partner.A possible solution is secure multi-party computation (SMC) and we give examples of its usefulness. We show with the example of supply chain optimization that only SMC provides the necessary security guarantees.A major challenge of SMC is its practical realization. We give a detailed study and analysis of multi-party permutation and show the relations of the different theoretical complexities in this case.The paper concludes with a comparison of service-oriented architectures and SMC. We show several architectural differences that need to be overcome.

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“…On the one hand, combining this data from many companies (just predecessor and successor is almost always insufficient) along the supply chain enables or improves many economically attractive collaborative applications, such as batch recalls [46], counterfeit detection [43], benchmarking and analytics [27,28,29] or estimated arrival forecasts [12]. We therefore expect an increasing interest by companies to adopt object-level tracking technology.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An access control model for mobile physical objects

Kerschbaum¹

2010

Proceedings of the 15th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies

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Access to distributed databases containing tuples collected about mobile physical objects requires information about the objects' trajectories. Existing access control models cannot encode this information efficiently. This poses a policy management problem to administrators in real-world supply chains where companies want to protect their goods tracking data. In this paper we propose a new access control model as an extension to attribute-based access control that allows trajectory-based visibility policies. We prove the security properties of our novel authentication protocol for distributed systems that can supply the decision algorithm with the necessary reliable information using only standard passive RFID tags. As a result companies will be able to improve confidentiality protection and governance of their object tracking data and more trustingly engage in data sharing agreements.

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On the practical importance of communication complexity for secure multi-party computation protocols

Cited by 28 publications

References 21 publications

L1 - An Intermediate Language for Mixed-Protocol Secure Computation

L1 - An Intermediate Language for Mixed-Protocol Secure Computation

Security against the business partner

An access control model for mobile physical objects

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