On the protocol composition logic PCL

Abstract

A recent development in formal security protocol analysis is the Protocol Composition Logic (PCL). We identify a number of problems with this logic as well as with extensions of the logic, as defined in [9,13,14,17,20,21]. The identified problems imply strong restrictions on the scope of PCL, and imply that some currently claimed PCL proofs cannot be proven within the logic, or make use of unsound axioms. Where possible, we propose solutions for these problems.

A Correctness Proof of a Mesh Security Architecture

“…The methodology of PCL has proven very successful in dealing with large-scale architectures. A recent paper by Cremers looked at the soundness of the various axioms of PCL [11]. For the problem of preceding actions, we have consistently used implicit pre-and post-conditions at the basic sequence level, leading to a tighter joining of actions.…”

Operational Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols

“…This setup inherits some of BAN's limitations, for example in terms of properties that can be proven. However, the scope of the base logic was limited and soundness problems persisted [54]. This approach can be seen as a specialised version of the Owicki-Gries approach [127] for proving concurrent programs correct.…”

Logic of Events for Proving Security Properties of Protocols

“…In Cremers' paper [12], authors identify a number of problems with PCL as defined in [8]. Authors suggest that it is at least required to make changes to existing axioms, to introduce new axioms, and to add a mechanism for a type system..…”