On the relationship between Keynes’s conception of evidential weight and the Ellsberg paradox

Feduzi, Alberto

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2007.01.005

Cited by 15 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Bu görüş nihai olarak belirsizlik altında tercihler teorisine Savage'ın yaklaşımına, yani belirsizliğin tamamen öznel olduğu ve olasılık değerlendirmesini kişinin tercihlerinin belirlediğine yol açar. Örneğin, iki kumar oyununun sonucu aynı ise, ancak biri diğerine tercih ediliyorsa, karar alıcı favori alternatif için daha yüksek kazanma olasılığı belirler (Feduzi, 2007). Öznelciler, herhangi bir olay için olasılık belirlenebileceğini varsayarlar.…”

Section: İktisatta Belirsizlik Ve Risk Kavramlarıunclassified

Beli̇rsi̇zli̇k Kavrami, Beli̇rsi̇zli̇k Ölçütleri̇ Ve Beli̇rsi̇zli̇ği̇n Makroekonomi̇k Etki̇leri̇ Üzeri̇ne Bi̇r İnceleme

Gürgün

2020

Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi

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Bu çalışmada iktisatta belirsizlik kavramı üzerinde durulmuş, 2008/2009 küresel finansal krizi sonrası oluşturulan belirsizlik ölçütleri değerlendirilmiş ve belirsizliğin makroekonomik etkileri incelenmiştir. Belirsizlik kavramı Cantillon ile iktisadi içerik kazanmıştır, ancak geleneksel iktisadın tam bilgi varsayımı altında kurulan modeller çerçevesinde gelişmesiyle belirsizlik kavramı büyük ölçüde ihmal edilmiştir. Knight ve Keynes 1921 yılında yazdıkları "Risk, Belirsizlik ve Kar" ve "Olasılık Üzerine İnceleme" adlı çalışmalarında belirsizliği ölçülemez bir kavram olarak nitelendirmiştir. Ancak, belirsizlik kavramına yönelik ilgi iktisatta matematiksel modellerin artarak kullanımıyla birlikte 1950'lerden itibaren azalmıştır. 2008/2009 küresel finansal krizinde belirsizlik çeşitli açılardan ortaya çıkmış ve belirsizlik kavramına ilgi artmıştır. Kriz sonrası yapılan birçok çalışmada farklı belirsizlik ölçütleri oluşturulmuş ve belirsizliğin ekonomiye etkileri irdelenmiştir.

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Section: İktisatta Belirsizlik Ve Risk Kavramlarıunclassified

Beli̇rsi̇zli̇k Kavrami, Beli̇rsi̇zli̇k Ölçütleri̇ Ve Beli̇rsi̇zli̇ği̇n Makroekonomi̇k Etki̇leri̇ Üzeri̇ne Bi̇r İnceleme

Gürgün

2020

Atatürk Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi

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“…Ellsberg is concerned with decisions under uncertainty, following the distinction drawn by Knight (1921) between measurable uncertainty (which Ellsberg calls risk) and unmeasurable uncertainty (which Ellsberg calls ambiguity). Similarly, John Maynard Keynes (1921) distinguishes between probabilities that can be assigned definite numerical values versus noncomparable probabilities for which the weight of evidence does not support numeric estimates (Feduzi 2007). Like Keynes, Ellsberg believes that in situations characterized by high ambiguity, rational actors may make decisions that cannot be explained by any assignment of numerical probabilities reflecting degrees of belief associated with events.…”

Section: Figmentioning

confidence: 99%

Avoiding Environmental Catastrophes: Varieties of Principled Precaution

Johnson¹

2012

E&S

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ABSTRACT. The precautionary principle is often proposed as a guide to action in environmental management or risk assessment, and has been incorporated in various legal and regulatory contexts. For many, it reflects the common sense notion of being safe rather than sorry, but it has attracted numerous critics. At times, proponents and critics talk at cross purposes, due to the multiplicity of ways the precautionary principle has been formulated. The approach taken here is to examine four general varieties of precaution, relating each to arguments made in various contexts by others. First, I examine the parallel between the precautionary principle and an argument referred to as Pascal's wager. Critics are right to dismiss versions of the precautionary principle that follow the logic of Pascal's wager, because that argument requires assumption of an infinite catastrophe, which is seldom the case in environmental decisions. Second, I explore precaution viewed as an instance of the phenomenon of ambiguity aversion as described by Daniel Ellsberg. Third, I evaluate precautionary perspectives on our duties to future generations, drawing inspiration from the views of Gifford Pinchot. Fourth, I consider the precautionary principle as an instance of Aldo Leopold's notion of intelligent tinkering. Although controversy persists, I find that a legitimate theoretical foundation exists to implement Ellsbergian, Pinchotian and Leopoldean varieties of precaution in environmental decision making. Additionally, I remark on the role of adaptive management and maintaining resilience in ecological and social systems as an approach to implementing the precautionary principle.

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“…Keynes"s distinction between "probability, representing the balance of evidence in favour of a particular proposition and the weight of evidence, representing the quantity of evidence supporting that balance" (Fox and Tversky, 1995, p. 585) has been widely used to explain some of the limits of the SEU model (Anand, 1991;Camerer and Weber, 1992;Curley and Yates, 1989;Ellsberg, 2001;Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985;Fox and Tversky, 1995;Gärdenfors and Sahlin, 1988;Kelsey, 1994;Tversky, 1997). The seminal contribution here is Ellsberg"s (1961) early critique of the SEU model, which is built around an example that is virtually identical to Keynes"s two colour urn example (Runde, 1994a;Fox and Tversky, 1995;Feduzi, 2007) and which inspired a significant research program over the last 30 years.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The point can be easily grasped by introducing some definitions. Let Ω be the set of all evidence which is relevant for estimating the probability of a proposition H. Let K be the set of relying on statistical criteria for determining the optimal dimension of the sample (Feduzi, 2007). Nevertheless, such standard statistical criteria do not seem to satisfy Keynes"s requirements for an objective principle as they also depend -to some extent -on subjective parameters such as the level of confidence chosen or the maximum error admitted.…”

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confidence: 99%