Abstract:Cyber decoys provide a means for automating, to a degree, counterintelligence activities and responses to cyber attacks. Like other security mechanisms for protecting information systems, it is likely that cyber decoys will in some instances be misused. In the United States, criminal law provides us with analogies for preventing or punishing improper state use of deception, and criminal and civil law give us a range of tools to use against private actors. However, in addition to states, nongovernmental entities and individuals can employ cybel' decoys. In this paper we present a principled analysis of the use of cyber decoys. We explore the absolute minima in terms of customary principles for what might be considered to be acceptable use of deception.Key words: Deception, Law, Computer security
DECEPTION IN CYBERSPACEIn [1], Michael et al. propose to use software-based deception as a means for hardening operational systems against attack. Critical units of software are wrapped with "decoying" rules, which are the cyber embodiment of both the policy (including doctrine) of an organization or individual for conducting counterintelligence and applying countermeasures against attackers. The wrappers are placed around critical units of software (e.g., a component or method) to be protected. By critical, we mean units of software that are integral to the continued survivability of an information system and the correct enforcement of the policy embedded in the system.When a wrapper detects a suspicious pattern of system calls by one or more computer processes, it begins to conduct counterintelligence tasks and initiates countermeasures; pattern recognition is performed at runtime. The