On the role of latent design conditions in cyber-physical systems security

Abstract

As cyber-physical systems (CPS) become prevalent in everyday life, it is critical to understand the factors that may impact the security of such systems. In this paper, we present insights from an initial study of historical security incidents to analyse such factors for a particular class of CPS: industrial control systems (ICS). Our study challenges the usual tendency to blame human fallibility or resort to simple explanations for what are often complex issues that lead to a security incident. We highlight that (i) perception errors are key in such incidents (ii) latent design conditions-e.g., improper specifications of a system's borders and capabilities-play a fundamental role in shaping perceptions, leading to security issues. Such design-time considerations are particularly critical for ICS, the life-cycle of which is usually measured in decades. Based on this analysis, we discuss how key characteristics of future smart CPS in such industrial settings can pose further challenges with regards to tackling latent design flaws.

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: A Study of Security Decisions in a Cyber-Physical Systems Game

“…A cyber-physical infrastructure, depicted through a Lego ® board, makes the game easy to understand and accessible to players from varying backgrounds and security expertise, without being too trivial a setting for security experts. The particular setting of a utility infrastructure is drawn from our prior experience of technical [26], [27] and non-technical investigations [28] as well as interviews with security experts, field engineers, IT users in such settings [29].…”

Preliminaries of Orthogonal Layered Defence Using Functional and Assurance Controls in Industrial Control Systems

“…The key elements to be considered is the method selected to carry out risk assessments, deployed risk models, and adaptation of risk appetite to properly enumerate the threat landscape in particular cases in which IT and ICS integration takes place. Risk-mitigation plans have recently found their way in the cyber-physical ICS environment [51][52][53]. The key components of an informed defence-in-depth framework, within which assurance and functional controls could be integrated, are presented as follows.…”

Smart Cyber-Physical Systems: Beyond Usable Security to Security Ergonomics by Design

“…Though research has looked at using smart CPS devices as a means to counter usability limitations of existing security feature designs, e.g., [11], the issues of security ergonomics in smart CPS environments have not been considered to date. Recent work by Frey et al [4] has discussed the role that system design plays in influencing operator perceptions during security incidents and highlighted potential challenges in the context of smart CPS. In this paper, we respond to the challenges highlighted by Frey et al and focus on security ergonomics as a key requirement for smart CPS.…”

“…Recent work [4] has analysed the role of latent design conditions in impacting security perceptions of operators in industrial control systems and highlighted the challenges posed by smart CPS, notably their emergent design arising from dynamic aggregation of a range of devices and services and the focus on automation that aims to "hide" complexity from the users. Whilst usability is considered a key non-functional requirement during software engineering and there is a body of research on usable security, in this paper we argue that the very properties of emergent design and automation pose key challenges with regards to security behaviours in smart CPS.…”