On the Role of Values in Social Research: Weber Vindicated?

Abstract

Weber's proposal that social science should aim to be value neutral is now widely rejected. However, I argue that his position was more sophisticated than is generally recognised, and that it is for the most part sound. Clarification of his position is provided, along with an outline of the reasons why it came to be rejected. I suggest that these are, for the most part, based upon misconceptions. I also demonstrate that there are fundamental problems with any notion of normative sociology, ones that are rarely addressed and have not been resolved.

Against modernist illusions: why we need more democratic and constructivist alternatives to debunking conspiracy theories

“…The moral and political opinions of the (social) scientist should therefore be kept as much as possible at bay. Although Weber's plea for a 'value-free' sociology has been criticised ever since (Gouldner, 1962;Hammersley, 2017), the ideal to temporarily suspense one's own ideas about truth and morality gained much traction in academia, remarkably in the positivistic and interpretative traditions alike (albeit differently). Like many scholars of religion, parapsychology, extremist groups, and other contestants of the (scientific) mainstream, during my research, I similarly bracketed off my personal thoughts about whether conspiracy theories are true, rational and/or harmless.…”

Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia and the public role of sociology

“…27 The role of intellectuals Like Weber's term 'value-freedom', the phrase 'socially unattached' or 'free-floating' intellectuals has often suffered from too literal an interpretation. Just as Weber did not mean that sociology could or should be completely free from value commitments (Hammersley, 2017), so Mannheim was not arguing that intellectuals are or can become completely unattached socially, enabling them to adopt a 'view from nowhere'. As noted earlier, he drew the idea of socially unattached intellectuals from Alfred Weber (see Loader, 2012: 46, 50-51), and his argument is that the social position of intellectuals, and their diverse backgrounds, allows (and perhaps even forces) them to distance themselves from their prior assumptions, and to recognise what may be of value in other perspectives.…”

Performing Trustworthiness: The ‘Credibility Work’ of Prominent Sociologists

“…Some critics focus on the inherent trustworthiness of sociological accounts, which they argue become untrustworthy if we are too close to civil society (Goldberg and Van den Berg, 2009; Hammersley, 2017; Nielsen, 2004; Tittle, 2004). But more importantly here, critics claim that even robust public sociology will be credibility-damaging because public sociologists display left-wing values that may not be shared by their audiences (Goldberg and Van den Berg, 2009; Tittle, 2004; Turner, 2005), and because they blur the distinction between knowledge and advocacy (Goldberg and Van den Berg, 2009; Hammersley, 2017; Tittle, 2004). As Turner (2005: 30) puts it: if sociologists simply throw their ideological hats into the ring, spouting off their own moral judgments, their credibility will be lost; and political counterattack will be easy.…”