On the rule of k names

Barberà, Salvador; Coelho, Danilo Santa Cruz

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.008

Cited by 26 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Proposition (Barberà and Coelho ) Consider a preference profile on a set of candidates

boldc

, and the game induced by the rule of k names (for

k \leq c false)

. The backward induction equilibrium outcome (the winning candidate) is the proposer's best candidate out of the chooser's

false(c - k + 1 false)

top candidates.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One family of such methods, which are reminiscent of the divide and choose procedure, are those that we have called in previous work rules of k names (Barberà and Coelho , ), where the aim is to choose one out of

boldc

candidates (

1 \leq k \leq c

). They work as follows: one of the parties is allowed to select k candidates out of the

boldc

available, and then the other party chooses one winner from those selected by the opponent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of k names

Barberà

Coelho

2018

Int J of Economic Theory

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Rules of k names are methods that allow two potentially conflicting parties to share the power to appoint officers. One of the parties (the proposer) selects k candidates from a larger pool, and then the other party (the chooser) selects the winner from this restricted list. We investigate conditions under which the two parties could agree ex ante on the distributions of roles, one of them preferring to be the chooser and the other preferring to be the proposer. We show that this may not always be possible, and discuss what are the relevant characteristics of the environments where agreement can be reached.

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“…Proposition (Barberà and Coelho ) Consider a preference profile on a set of candidates

boldc

, and the game induced by the rule of k names (for

k \leq c false)

. The backward induction equilibrium outcome (the winning candidate) is the proposer's best candidate out of the chooser's

false(c - k + 1 false)

top candidates.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

boldc

candidates (

1 \leq k \leq c

). They work as follows: one of the parties is allowed to select k candidates out of the

boldc

available, and then the other party chooses one winner from those selected by the opponent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of k names

Barberà

Coelho

2018

Int J of Economic Theory

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“…While this literature aims to model the whole process of amendments and modifications of a proposal, we only model the initial decision of placing an issue on the agenda, and we account for the process between the selection and the decision stage with the assumption that it generates uncertainty at the outset about the final proposal. Other papers that endogenize the selection of proposals are Barbera and Coelho (2010), in which a committee votes on a list of names among which a third party can then make a choice, and Copic and Katz (2007), in which some members of the committee propose a certain move from the status quo along an idiosyncratic dimension and a speaker then decides which of these moves will be considered in the decision voting procedure.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues

2013

Econometrica

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We study selection rules: voting procedures used by committees to choose whether to place an issue on their agenda. At the selection stage of the model, committee members are uncertain about their final preferences. They only have some private information about these preferences. We show that voters become more conservative when the selection rule itself becomes more conservative. The decision rule has the opposite effect. We compare these voting procedures to the designation of an agenda setter among the committee and to a utilitarian social planner with all the ex interim private information.

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“…Because the electors and House members are different electorates, the overall process bears some resemblance to a 'screening or nominating' social choice method as analyzed by Barberá and Coelho (2010). The floor debate shows that delegates thought about interactions between the two stages of the selection process.…”

Section: The Origins Of the Electoral College And Applied Social Choimentioning

confidence: 99%