On the Security of Three Versions of the WAI Protocol in Chinese WLAN Implementation Plan

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the security properties of three versions of the WAI protocol in Chinese WLAN implementation plan. We first revisit the security analysis that has been done to the version 1 and 2. we show that the security proof given by Li, Moon, and Ma is incorrect and the alternative protocol EWAP of Zhang and Ma is insecure. We further analyse the third version of the WAI protocol and prove its security in the Canetti-Krawczyk model. In addition, we also provide some practical security analysis of this version.

Security analysis of certificate authentication in Chinese WLAN standard

“…3) AP must validates the message authentication code from AP. Li, Moon and Ma [8] show that the second version of the WAI protocol is secure in the CK (CanettiKrawczyk) model, but Tang [9] points out that the second version does not guarantee key authentication and entity authentication properties. For the third version of WAI protocol, a Diffie-Hellman key exchange over a group based on elliptic curves is adopted.…”

The Denial of Service Attack Analysis of WLAN Authentication Infrastructure

“…3) AP must validates the message authentication code from AP. Li, Moon and Ma [8] show that the second version of the WAI protocol is secure in the CK (Canetti-Krawczyk) model, but Tang [9] points out that the second version does not guarantee key authentication and entity authentication properties. For the third version of WAI protocol, a Diffie-Hellman key exchange over a group based on elliptic curves is adopted.…”

“…For the third version of WAI protocol, a Diffie-Hellman key exchange over a group based on elliptic curves is adopted. Currently, Tang [9] and Wu et al [10] prove the security of the third version in CK model. Tie, Li and Huang et al [11] also use a formal logic of PCL (Protocol Composition Logic) to prove that WAPI certificate authentication protocol has guaranteed the required security prosperities.…”