On the Self-interested Use of Equity in International Climate Negotiations

Lange, Andreas; Löschel, Andreas; Vogt, Carsten; Ziegler, Andreas

doi:10.3386/w14930

Cited by 35 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…The results may however be more in line with empirical observations of self-serving bias both in experiments and real-world climate negotiations (e.g. Brekke et al 2012;Lange et al 2010). Both poor, highly vulnerable and rich, little vulnerable participants appear to take into account the weaker position of highly vulnerable players for rejecting an offer.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 85%

“…The UNFCCC stalemate is largely due to the difficulty of aligning interests of multiple heterogeneous negotiation parties (Victor 2011). Yet governments often invoke fairness principles, even if frequently picking those accommodating their country's economic self interest (Lange et al 2010). Large emerging economies (India, Brazil, China) are strong advocates of pure historical responsibility, which would place relatively light obligations on them.…”

Section: Burden Sharing Principles In the Unfccc Process And The Relementioning

confidence: 99%

“…These criteria reflect different, but not mutually exclusive, conceptions of distributive justice. Governments frequently invoke these principles in negotiations and public debate to justify their stance on burden sharing (Ringius et al 2002; International Institute for Sustainable Development 2012b ;Stalley 2012;Lange et al 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Do individuals care about fairness in burden sharing for climate change mitigation? Evidence from a lab experiment

Gampfer

2014

Climatic Change

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One of the reasons for deadlock in global climate policy is countries' disagreement on how to share the mitigation burden. Normative theory suggests various fairness criteria for structuring burden sharing, most prominently, historical responsibility for emissions, economic capacity, and vulnerability to climate change. Governments have taken up these criteria in their rhetoric at UNFCCC negotiations. I examine whether normative criteria influence individual burden sharing preferences. This bottom-up perspective is important for two reasons. First, it is unknown if governments' fairness rhetoric matches citizens' actual preferences. Second, international climate agreements directly affect individuals through domestic policy measures (e.g. energy taxes), and therefore require domestic public support for successful implementation. I conducted two laboratory experiments where participants have to agree on how to share climate change mitigation costs in an ultimatum game. Treatment conditions include differences between proposer and responder in capacity, vulnerability (experiment 1), and historical emissions (experiment 2). Historical emissions are endogenously determined in a prior game. Capacity inequality strongly affects burden sharing, with richer players ending up paying more, and poorer players less. Vulnerability differences reduce the influence of fairness, leading to suggested cost distributions more unfavorable to vulnerable players. However, vulnerable responders still reject many "unfair" offers. Differences in historical responsibility result in cost distributions strongly correlated with players' relative contributions to climate change. The results suggest that more nuanced consideration of fairness criteria in burden sharing could make ambitious climate agreements more acceptable for reluctant countries and their citizens.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 85%

Section: Burden Sharing Principles In the Unfccc Process And The Relementioning

confidence: 99%

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Do individuals care about fairness in burden sharing for climate change mitigation? Evidence from a lab experiment

Gampfer

2014

Climatic Change

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“…And as Akerlof and Dickens (1982, p. 307) explain, agents can manipulate their own beliefs by selecting sources of information, which tend to confirm desired beliefs. This might explain why Lange et al (2010) find that perceived support of different equity rules is generally consistent with economic self-interest. Negotiators in international climate policy tend to a big extent to advocate those equity principles, which bring about the highest benefit for their country, and they select their beliefs about equity and justice accordingly.…”

Section: A Support Of Mitigationmentioning

confidence: 97%

International Climate Finance and Its Influence on Fairness and Policy

Pittel

Rübbelke

2013

World Economy

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Besides costs and benefits, fairness aspects tend to influence negotiating parties’ willingness to join an international agreement on climate change mitigation. Fairness is largely considered to improve the prospects of success of international negotiations and hence measures raising fairness perception might – in turn – help to bring about effective cooperative international climate change mitigation. We consider the influences present international support of climate policy in developing countries exerts on fairness perception and how this again might affect international negotiations. In doing so we distinguish between fairness perception that is based on historical experiences and perception that is based on conjectures about opponents’ intentions. By identifying beneficial components of current support schemes lessons can be learnt for designing new schemes like the Green Climate Fund.

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“…Lange et al . () show that the perceived support of different equity rules by regions in international climate negotiations may be explained by the ranking of their economic costs and tend to correspond to their material self‐interest. However, there is little empirical evidence on the acceptable level of costs and the willingness to pay to avoid the negative consequences of climate change.…”

Section: Empirical Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%