On the Stability of Cyber-Physical Control Systems With Sensor Multiplicative Attacks

Cómbita, Luis Francisco; Quijano, Nicanor; Cárdenas, Álvaro A.

doi:10.1109/access.2022.3164424

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…From ( 12), H 1 can be calculated. With H 1 , T 1 can be obtained from (14). In order to find F 1 using ( 13), observability must first be verified, or, at least, the detectability of the pair (A 1 1 , C 1 ).…”

Section: Uios Bank Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, these works assume that there are low-level control loops that cannot be accessed by attackers, but, in cyber-security, it is well known that this feature is usually related to the available budget of the attacker (13). Besides, an attack on one sensor of a low-level controller is enough to cause changes in the stability of the overall system, which can have catastrophic consequences, as demonstrated in (14).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Defending State-Feedback Based Controllers Against Sensor Attacks

Cómbita

Quijano

Cárdenas

2023

Ing.

Self Cite

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Context: This paper is motivated by the need to improve the resilience of industrial control systems. Many control systems currently operating in the industry were designed and implemented before the boom in communications (wired and wireless networks) within industrial control systems. However, nowadays they operate connected to the communications network. This increase in connectivity has made the systems susceptible to cyber-attacks that seek to degrade the proper operation of the control loop even affecting only one sensor. Method: We use concepts from fault tolerant control and classic control theory to show that it is possible to reconstruct the system state without (any) one of the system outputs. This fact is used in the recalculation of the control signal through an algorithm of attack detection and isolation, to avoid for an attack to be feedback to the system, mitigating its effect. We show the effectiveness of our proposal with simulations on a four-tanks testbed using Matlab and Simulink. Results: We show that a bank of unknown input observers can be designed to recover true information from attacked sensors, i.e., recover the information without the effect of the attack. Therefore, the estimation obtained from those observers can be utilized for computing a control action that mitigates the effect of the attack. Conclusions: This mitigation of the attack prevents a single sensor attack from signi cantly impair the action of low-level controllers, improving the resilience on the system just modifying the digital controller architecture. The development presented is limited to cyber-attacks on system sensors pre- sented one at a time, that still can compromise seriously the system behavior. Future work will address the extension of the presented results in situations with simultaneous attacks on more than one sensor, and/or consider attacks on the control system actuators.

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Section: Uios Bank Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Defending State-Feedback Based Controllers Against Sensor Attacks

Cómbita

Quijano

Cárdenas

2023

Ing.

Self Cite

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“…Due to the interconnected nature of a cyber-physical system like a PCS, a comprehensive solution to enhancing the cybersecurity of PCSs may involve adopting a multi-faceted approach that involves both information technology-based and operational technologybased approaches. The approaches proposed in the literature broadly include those that reinforce information technology-based infrastructure (e.g., firewalls [3] and network design-based approaches [4,5]), approaches that involve cybersecure architecture design (e.g., [6]), approaches for process equipment design to mitigate adverse impacts of a cyberattack (e.g., [7,8]), and the design of operational technology (OT)-based approaches for detecting, identifying, and successfully recovering from an ongoing cyberattack [6,[9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detection of Multiplicative False Data Injection Cyberattacks on Process Control Systems via Randomized Control Mode Switching

Narasimhan,

Ellis,

El-Farra

2024

Processes

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A fundamental problem at the intersection of process control and operations is the design of detection schemes monitoring a process for cyberattacks using operational data. Multiplicative false data injection (FDI) attacks modify operational data with a multiplicative factor and could be designed to be detection evading without in-depth process knowledge. In a prior work, we presented a control mode switching strategy that enhances the detection of multiplicative FDI attacks in processes operating at steady state (when process states evolve within a small neighborhood of the steady state). Control mode switching on the attack-free process at steady-state may induce transients and generate false alarms in the detection scheme. To minimize false alarms, we subsequently developed a control mode switch-scheduling condition for processes with an invertible output matrix. In the current work, we utilize a reachable set-based detection scheme and use randomized control mode switches to augment attack detection capabilities. The detection scheme eliminates potential false alarms occurring from control mode switching, even for processes with a non-invertible output matrix, while the randomized switching helps bolster the confidentiality of the switching schedule, preventing the design of a detection-evading “smart” attack. We present two simulation examples to illustrate attack detection without false alarms, and the merits of randomized switching (compared with scheduled switching) for the detection of a smart attack.

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