On the strategic stability of monitoring: implications for cooperative wildlife programmes in Africa

Mesterton‐Gibbons, Mike; Milner‐Gulland, E. J.

doi:10.1098/rspb.1998.0425

Cited by 17 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Previous studies examining the enforcement of resourceuse rules have tended to concentrate on the users' incentives (for example fishers or poachers; Leader-Williams & MilnerGulland 1993;Skonhoft & Solstad 1996;Damania et al 2005). However, the success of enforcement also depends crucially on monitors' incentives to carry out their duties (Mookherjee & Png 1995;Mesterton-Gibbons & Milner-Gulland 1998;Robinson et al 2010). The model presented here explores the effects on conservation outcomes of changes to three potential policy levers intended to promote monitoring and discourage poaching.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Mesterton-Gibbons and Milner-Gulland (1998) found that the payment of fees was essential for the stability of monitoring as a strategy. The discrepancy between this finding and ours results from differences in the range of behaviours which modelled individuals were allowed to adopt.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Sanctions include fines for individuals caught poaching and monitors found to be neglecting their duties, which are common to many systems of enforcement. The model draws upon the much simpler analytical model of Mesterton-Gibbons and Milner-Gulland (1998).…”

Section: Model Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

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Modelling the effect of individual strategic behaviour on community-level outcomes of conservation interventions

2012

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SUMMARYMany conservation interventions seek to change resource users' behaviour through the creation and enforcement of rules. Their success depends on changing the incentives of potential rule-breakers and those who monitor and enforce compliance. Project implementers may use payments to encourage monitoring and sanctions to deter rule breaking but there has been little research to examine the effectiveness of such approaches in promoting compliance with conservation rules. The effects of payments and sanctions on poaching in a hypothetical community-based conservation project were investigated using an individual-based model incorporating individual heterogeneity and a realistic range of behaviours. Individuals could choose to poach, monitor others' behaviour, or 'cheat' (claim a fee without actually monitoring behaviour). They could also invest in avoidance to reduce their probability of being detected breaking rules. Community-level outcomes emerged from individuals' choices and strategic interactions. The model demonstrates that payments and sanctions can interact strongly with one another and that their effects depend on the economic context in which they are applied. Sanctions were more reliable than payments in reducing poaching and, in some circumstances, payments produced perverse effects. It is thus important to consider individual-level heterogeneity and strategic decision-making when designing interventions aimed at changing human behaviour.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Modelling the effect of individual strategic behaviour on community-level outcomes of conservation interventions

2012

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“…Mesterton-Gibbons and Milner-Gulland (1998) posited that Zimbabwean local communities used cooperative game theory to determine the conditions under which community self-monitoring would ensure conservation occurs. These researchers in Zimbabwe concluded that ""no self-monitoring agreement can be sustainable without a payment to each individual that exceeds the opportunity cost of monitoring even if no one is poaching"".…”

Section: Common Property Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Property rights regimes, resource utilisation and biodiversity conservation in Eastern and Southern Africa

Nyirenda¹

2015

Int. J. Biodivers. Conserv.

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Natural resources degradation threatens persistence of biological resources in many parts of Eastern and Southern African regions. In these regions, property rights regimes intractably influence resource utilisation and biodiversity conservation. Hitherto, the underlying causes of varied performances of property rights regimes are rarely collated. Consequently, resource policies are often flawed, resulting in pervasive systems failure and biodiversity losses. In this study, this particular information gap is interrogated by systematically reviewing various property rights regimes, their influence on resource utilisation and biodiversity conservation from wealthy of available literature. The results unravelled that the performance of various property rights regimes are influenced by levels of social capital, encompassing stakeholders' participation, trust, commitment and social networking at the base regardless of whether the property rights areby full hegemony or sanctioned by higher authorities.This findingcloselyapproximatestheconceptofenvironmentalsubsidiarityinnaturalresourcemanagement.Furth er, it is concluded that bottom-up self-institutional regulation and top-down state controlplay complimentary if not invasive role to each other. These approaches stimulate sustainable resource utilisation and biodiversity conservation, where legal actors are given full resource property rights to access, own, utilise and exclude intruders to avoid the 'tragedy of the commons'.

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“…Whilst economic models (e.g. Mesterton-Gibbons & Milner-Gulland 1998) and institutional analysis (e.g. Agrawal & Gibson 1999) provide insights into decision-making of individuals, social psychological variables also influence decision-making and behaviour (Salafsky et al 2001;Horwich & Lyon 2007;St John et al 2011).…”

Section: Addressing Human Threatsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The psychology of community-based conservation programs: A case study of the Sumatran orangutan

Nilsson¹

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Globally, dramatic declines in wildlife populations continue due to anthropogenic pressures. Many of these declines are linked to unsustainable human behaviours. In developing countries, community-based conservation programs are essential for arresting these declines. However, many programs are not effective and require substantial improvements if they are to deliver sustainable conservation outcomes. The social sciences, including conservation psychology, provide an opportunity to understand the social dimension of conservation problems and improve the effectiveness of community-based conservation programs. The Sumatran orangutan (Pongo abelli) is a suitable case study for this approach. The species is critically endangered due to habitat loss and degradation, the illegal wildlife trade, hunting, and human-wildlife conflict. The future of the species relies heavily upon effectively engaging with local communities to support the conservation of the orangutan and its habitat.This thesis aims to inform community-based conservation strategies that effectively incentivise and motivate local communities in the context of developing countries to adopt conservation behaviours. To achieve this, I ask: What are the socio-psychological factors and processes that determine how community-based conservation programs influence behaviour change and community support? How can this knowledge be utilised to more effectively design, implement and manage community-based conservation programs? The thesis addresses these research questions using a socio-psychological approach to investigating secondary data from developing countries and also by conducting a comparative case study of community-based conservation programs for the Sumatran orangutan. This research is the first in-depth socio-psychological investigation for Sumatran orangutan community-based conservation programs.First, I conduct a realist synthesis focused on community-based conservation programs in developing countries that measured changes in community behaviour in relation to conservation objectives. A realist synthesis identifies the critical mechanisms operating within a program, the outcome caused by this mechanism and how the context affects these mechanisms. The synthesis highlights three main mechanisms that explain the reasoning of individuals to engage in conservation behaviours: 'conservation livelihood provides economic value,' 'conservation provides benefits that outweigh losses of curtailing previous behaviour' and 'local authority over resources creates empowerment.' The success of each mechanism was affected by various contexts including: relative significance of income, capacity and cultural acceptability. The findings from the synthesis advance the understanding of the decision-making processes of communities subject to iii community-based conservation programs and highlight how different contexts alter the reasoning process.Second, utilising the comparative case studies, I investigate the effect of differing motivations on community's decisio...

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On the strategic stability of monitoring: implications for cooperative wildlife programmes in Africa

Cited by 17 publications

References 18 publications

Modelling the effect of individual strategic behaviour on community-level outcomes of conservation interventions

Modelling the effect of individual strategic behaviour on community-level outcomes of conservation interventions

Property rights regimes, resource utilisation and biodiversity conservation in Eastern and Southern Africa

The psychology of community-based conservation programs: A case study of the Sumatran orangutan

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