On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies

Delegation and firms’ ability to collude

“…How about factors that, on the contrary, can be manipulated to some extent before market competition or collusion takes place? A lot of e®ort has been produced in analysing the interaction between the stability of collusion and the degree of product di®erentiation (see, inter alia, Deneckere, 1983;Chang, 1991;Ross, 1992;Rothschild, 1992; HÄ ackner, 1994 and 1995; Lambertini, 1997; Lambertini et al, 1998; Alb½k and Lambertini, 1998). This literature o®ers ambiguous results.…”

Price vs quantity in a duopoly supergame with Nash punishments

“…Then, under the assumption that firms are able to collude along the frontier of industry profits irrespective of the market variable(s) being set, a meta-game is introduced, whereby firms choose market variables once and for all, the payoffs 1 The number of contributions in this field is very large. See Deneckere (1983Deneckere ( , 1984, Majerus (1988), Ross (1992), Rothschild (1992), Albaek and Lambertini (1998) and Lambertini and Sasaki (1999,2002), inter alia.…”

Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation

“…On the other hand, there exists a wide literature concerning the e®ects of the amount of product di®erentiation, on the stability of implicit collusion either in output levels or in prices (Deneckere, 1983 ;Chang, 1991Chang, , 1992Rothschild, 1992 ;Ross, 1992 ;Friedman and Thisse, 1993 ;HÄ ackner, 1994HÄ ackner, , 1995HÄ ackner, , 1996Lambertini, 1997, inter alia). All this literature, apart from HÄ ackner (1996), uses the traditional Friedman (1971) formulation of folk theorem.…”