On the use of evidence theory in belief base revision

Abstract

This paper deals with belief base revision that is a form of belief change consisting of the incorporation of new facts into an agent's beliefs represented by a finite set of propositional formulas. In the aim to guarantee more reliability and rationality for real applications while performing revision, we propose the idea of credible belief base revision yielding to define two new formula-based revision operators using the suitable tools offered by evidence theory. These operators, uniformly presented in the same spirit of others in [9], stem from consistent subbases maximal with respect to credibility instead of set inclusion and cardinality. Moreover, in between these two extremes operators, evidence theory let us shed some light on a compromise operator avoiding losing initial beliefs to the maximum extent possible. Its idea captures maximal consistent sets stemming from all possible intersections of maximal consistent subbases. An illustration of all these operators and a comparison with others are inverstigated by examples.

Revision of prioritized $$\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}$$ ontologies

“…The choice of subbases that are maximally consistent with regard to set cardinality does not necessarily guarantee that the most pertinent information will be chosen, and as a result, it is possible to overlook viable formulas based on the initial agent's beliefs. For such a reason, Ktari et al in [63] introduced the idea of credible belief base revision, which leads to two new formula-based revision operators, namely Credible Set Revision Ginberg (CSRG) and Credible Set Revision Widtio (CSRW ). Such operators are presented in the same spirit as others in [62], which are based on selecting maximally consistent subsets with respect to credibility instead of set inclusion and cardinality.…”