On the use of non-coherent fault trees in safety and security studies

Contini, S.; Cojazzi, G.; Guido, Renda

doi:10.1016/j.ress.2008.03.018

Cited by 30 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…For binary tree structures (fault and attack trees), BDD's have been applied to simplify the modeling threats on complex systems [1,4,5,17,18]. The common approach to determine probabilities on binary tree structures is to apply probability equations, such as those described in [6].…”

Section: Determining System Output Probabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fault trees were originally developed to identify the effects of component failures on a system [16] while attack trees traditionally focused on the effects of cyber security breaches [14]. There have been recent variants of these trees, and sometimes these trees have been used interchangeably [2,5,6,7,11]. However, these trees all have one thing in common: they are binaryvalued trees, connected with AND and OR operators.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Using Multiple-Valued Logic Decision Diagrams to Model System Threat Probabilities

Manikas

Thornton

Feinstein³

2011

2011 41st IEEE International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic

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Abstract-System security continues to be of increasing importance. To effectively address both natural and intentional threats to large systems, the threats must be cataloged and analyzed. Extremely large and complex systems can have an accordingly large number of threat scenarios. Simply listing the threats and devising countermeasures for each is ineffective and not efficient. We describe a threat cataloging methodology whereby a large number of threats can be efficiently cataloged and analyzed for common features. This allows countermeasures to be formulated that address a large number of threats that share common features. The methodology utilizes MultipleValued Logic for describing the state of a large system and a multiple-valued decision diagram (MDD) for the threat catalog and analysis.Large System Security, Threat cataloging, MDD

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Section: Determining System Output Probabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Using Multiple-Valued Logic Decision Diagrams to Model System Threat Probabilities

Manikas

Thornton

Feinstein³

2011

2011 41st IEEE International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic

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“…Clearly, the VOT(1) gate is equivalent to an OR-gate and a VOT(k) gate with k children is equivalent to an AND-gate. Sometimes other gates are considered, like the XOR (exclusive OR) and the NOT gate [2], [17]. Adding such gates makes fault trees non-coherent, i.e.…”

Section: Dfts: the General Recipementioning

confidence: 99%

“…These gates may yield noncoherent fault-trees [26]: an additional failed event may turn the system into an operational state again. As this seldomly occurs [17], a common approach (for SFTs) is to represent XOR elements by OR gates. Whereas this approach is guaranteed to under-approximate the system performance for SFTs, it may yield an over-approximation for DFTs.…”

Section: T(a) < T(b) T(a) = T(b) T(a) > T(b)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Uncovering Dynamic Fault Trees

Junges

Guck

Katoen

et al. 2016

2016 46th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)

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Abstract-Fault tree analysis is a widespread industry standard for assessing system reliability. Standard (static) fault trees model the failure behaviour of systems in dependence of their component failures. To overcome their limited expressive power, common dependability patterns, such as spare management, functional dependencies, and sequencing are considered. A plethora of such dynamic fault trees (DFTs) have been defined in the literature. They differ in e.g., the types of gates (elements), their meaning, expressive power, the way in which failures propagate, how elements are claimed and activated, and how spare races are resolved. This paper systematically uncovers these differences and categorises existing DFT variants. As these differences may have huge impact on the reliability assessment, awareness of these impacts is important when using DFT modelling and analysis.

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“…They may induce misleading results for non-coherent systems. Although fault trees are traditionally designed to be coherent, non-coherent fault trees have also been shown useful [41]. Fussell-Vesely is also unable to discriminate the aforementioned two cases: (i) low IB and high IC: The component needs to be improved and (ii) low IC and high IB: The structure function needs to be improved.…”

Section: Spectral Evaluation Of Fault Treesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identifying critical architectural components with spectral analysis of fault trees

Ayav

Szer

2016

Applied Soft Computing

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a b s t r a c tWe increasingly rely on software-intensive embedded systems. Increasing size and complexity of these hardware/software systems makes it necessary to evaluate reliability at the system architecture level. One aspect of this evaluation is sensitivity analysis, which aims at identifying critical components of the architecture. These are the components of which unreliability contributes the most to the unreliability of the system. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for sensitivity analysis based on spectral analysis of fault trees. We show that measures obtained with our approach are both consistent and complementary with respect to the recognized metrics in the literature.

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On the use of non-coherent fault trees in safety and security studies

Cited by 30 publications

References 21 publications

Using Multiple-Valued Logic Decision Diagrams to Model System Threat Probabilities

Using Multiple-Valued Logic Decision Diagrams to Model System Threat Probabilities

Uncovering Dynamic Fault Trees

Identifying critical architectural components with spectral analysis of fault trees

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