On the Usefulness of the Conspiracy Mentality Concept

Abstract

The current commentary aims at defending the usefulness of the conspiracy mentality construct and emphasize its advantages over other ways to conceptualize and measure conspiracy beliefs. In contrast to specific conspiracy theories, items tapping into conspiracy mentality are typically not ideologically laden and are typically neither true nor false. They thus provide a purer measure of endorsing a conspiracy worldview – independent of ideological leaning or concerns of accuracy. Responding to Nera’s complaint about a Black Box definition of conspiracy mentality, the current commentary argues that the current state of the literature goes beyond that. Far from defining conspiracy mentality only in terms of agreeing with specific conspiracy theories, scholars have postulated its constituents (e.g., anti-elitism) and established some associates (e.g., generalized distrust). Whether a more fine-grained approach to conspiracy mentality as a multi-faceted construct will provide more useful is to be conceptually argued and empirically demonstrated instead of merely claimed.

Not All Conspiracy Theories Are Created Equal

“…Further adding to the issue of the generalized mindset, these data indicate that while pro-state conspiracy beliefs show a positive relationship with most subfacets of a scale aiming to tap into the general propensity to endorse conspiracy beliefs (Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale; Brotherton et al, 2013), this relationship reverses for the government malfeasance subfacet. This empirical finding mirrors the warning that enriching conspiracy belief items with concrete context will introduce other sources of variance than the mere propensity to endorse a conspiracy-based explanation (see Imhoff, 2024, this issue).…”

“…In his research spotlight, Nera (2024a, this issue) challenges the notion of conspiracy mentality. The ensuing commentaries by Sutton and colleagues (2024, this issue), Pummerer (2024, this issue), and Imhoff (2024, this issue) offer an opportunity to reassess the concept, and they are followed by concluding remarks from Nera (2024b, this issue). In this debate, the authors discuss the exact meaning of the conspiracy mentality concept, whether and in which ways it is different from (the general or isolated) belief in specific conspiracy theories, and what the causal relation between the two might be.…”

Thinking the Relationships Between Conspiracy Mentality and Belief in Conspiracy Theories

“…There is little, if anything, I disagree with in the comments of Imhoff (2024, this issue), Pummerer (2024, this issue), and Sutton et al (2024, this issue). In this response, I synthetize and expand on key points of agreement and on nuances brought up by the authors.…”

“…It does not rule out the notion that conspiracy mentality may foster the endorsement of prescriptive beliefs (e.g., the notion society would be better off under a direct democracy system; Pantazi et al, 2022) or behavioral outcomes (e.g., not get vaccinated; see Jolley et al, 2020). However, I propose that such outcomes may be characterized as associates, rather than constituents of conspiracy mentality (to use the terms of Imhoff, 2024). Finally, it is important to stress that descriptive beliefs are not necessarily evaluatively neutral.…”

“…All three comments proposed to identify mechanisms accounting for the causal relationship between conspiracy mentality and belief in specific conspiracy theories. Sutton and colleagues (2024, this issue) and Imhoff (2024, this issue) evoked mechanisms of generic-to-specific and specific-to-generic inference (which they refer to as deduction and induction, respectively). They rightfully argue that these mechanisms can account for both causal directions proposed in Nera (2024, this issue).…”