On the validity of the Bell-La Padula model

Improved multilevel security with latent semantic indexing

“…In lattice-based access control policies that based on BLPM two fundamental precepts can be found. Firstly, it is not allowed to read up (Lindgreen & Herschberg, 1994). This means a subject cannot read information that is of a higher security category than the subject's clearance.…”

“…This cannot be realized with a MLS approach that is based on BLPM where the classification of the object equals the highest security category and the union of all needs-to-know categories of the information stored in this object. The granularity of an object is not defined in BLPM (Lindgreen & Herschberg, 1994). In literature, examples can be found that identifies an object with a segment that may be a file or a multiple variable (Bell & LaPadula, 1976, Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975.…”

Security in Computing Systems

“…McLean [342,343] reconsiders the Basic Security Theorem of that study. Lindgreen/Herschberg [322] present a critical view of the achievements of the study. Sandhu [428] gives a concise summary of the many variants and applications that evolved.…”

“…11,19,181,194,195,321,322,327,355, 561, 591 control and monitoring 173, 181, 194, 199, 203, 240, 327, 348, 355, This view offers the possibility to employ the well-understood theory of systems of linear equations.…”

Granular Deleting in Multi Level Security Models – An Electronic Engineering Approach

“…Further, a subject of higher security level could not write information within a text written by a subject of lower security level. It could be clearly seen that a workflow between those two subjects is not supported by existing MLS operation systems [9,10,11].…”