On the welfare analysis of a cross-border merger

Kabiraj, Tarun; Chaudhuri, Manas Kumar

doi:10.1080/09638199900000012

Cited by 14 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 8 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…As is appropriate for cross-border acquisitions, he placed his analysis in the context of Direct Foreign Investment (DFI). The M&A studies in, Barros and Cabral (1994), Head and Ries (1997), Kabiraj and Chaudhuri (1999), and Horn and Levinshon (2001) analyzed the welfare effects of M&A and derive policy implications. The positive issue of equilibrium market structure via M&A in an international context has been analyzed by Horn and Persson (2001), NorbKack and Persson (2004).…”

Section: Theories and Models Of Mandamentioning

confidence: 99%

A Risk Management Model for Merger and Acquisition

Chui

2011

International Journal of Engineering Business Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, a merger and acquisition risk management model is proposed for considering risk factors in the merger and acquisition activities. The proposed model aims to maximize the probability of success in merger and acquisition activities by managing and reducing the associated risks. The modeling of the proposed merger and acquisition risk management model is described and illustrated in this paper. The illustration result shows that the proposed model can help to screen the best target company with minimum associated risks in the merger and acquisition activity.

show abstract

Section: Theories and Models Of Mandamentioning

confidence: 99%

A Risk Management Model for Merger and Acquisition

Chui

2011

International Journal of Engineering Business Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…See Horn and Levinsohn (1997) for example. Kabiraj and Chaudhuri (1999) compare the relative profitability and welfare effects of national and cross-border mergers, and show that there exists a range of merger efficiency gains for which a cross-border merger would lead to higher domestic welfare than a national merger. 6 They consider both fixed cost saving and variable cost rationalision motivations for mergers and relate the potential conflicts to the international distribution of consumption and ownership of firms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous mergers and tariffs in an integrated market

Falvey¹

2005

Trade Theory, Analytical Models and Development

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The last few decades have seen a significant reduction in trade barriers, which has brought the international aspects of competition policies into greater prominence. In this paper we explore the effects of tariffs on the profitability and welfare consequences of mergers in a simple model of the integrated world market for a single homogeneous product in which firms differ in their levels of efficiency. We find that the tariff "protects" less efficient firms from closure through merger if they are import-competing, but makes such closure more likely if they are exporters. Thus a tariff is likely to generate mergers of exporting firms. The implications of the tariff for the global welfare consequences of mergers depend on the tariff's effects on total output. If the tariff reduces (increases) total output, mergers are less (more) likely to raise welfare.

show abstract

“…A number of authors have studied various normative or positive issues related to mergers in a multicountry context. Some have looked at the welfare effects of international (i.e., cross-border) mergers or made comparisons with the effect of national mergers (Barros and Cabral, 1994;Falvey, 1998;Kabiraj and Chaudhuri, 1999); others have stressed the interaction of competition policy and optimal trade policy in the context of oligopolistic competition (Collie, 2000;Horn and Levinsohn, 1997). This paper is more closely related to those that consider explicitly the effect of tariff reductions on potential merger behavior of the firms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Domestic Mergers

Gaudet

Kanouni

2004

Rev International Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is often thought that a tariff reduction, by opening-up the domestic market to foreign firms, should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discouraging domestic mergers. This implicitly assumes that the tariff in question is sufficiently high to prevent foreign firms from selling in the domestic market. However, not all tariffs are prohibitive, so that foreign firms may be present in the domestic market before it is abolished. Furthermore, even if the tariff is prohibitive, a merger of domestic firms may render it nonprohibitive, thus inviting foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. Using a simple example, the authors show that, in the latter two cases, abolishing the tariff may in fact make the domestic merger more profitable. Hence trade liberalization will not necessarily reduce the profitability of domestic mergers. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.

show abstract

On the welfare analysis of a cross-border merger

Cited by 14 publications

References 8 publications

A Risk Management Model for Merger and Acquisition

A Risk Management Model for Merger and Acquisition

Endogenous mergers and tariffs in an integrated market

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Domestic Mergers

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About