On the Welfare Effects of Tied Aid

Schweinberger, Albert G.

doi:10.2307/2526850

Cited by 52 publications

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“…It is widely accepted that many forms of foreign aid (both public and private) are tied to certain conditions and one generally distinguishes between three different types of tying [5]. First, aid may be tied to the consumption of certain goods [10,13,14,18,19].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The short and long run effects of tied foreign aid on pollution abatement, pollution and employment: A pilot model

Schweinberger

Woodland

2008

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The short and long run effects of tied foreign aid on pollution abatement, pollution and employment: A pilot model

Schweinberger

Woodland

2008

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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“…Graciela Chichilnisky, Jagdish Bhagwati and settings, see e.g. Jones (1967,1985), Ohyama (1974), Gale (1974), Chichilnisky (1980), Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1983), Kemp and Kojima (1985), Schweinberger (1990), Kemp (1995), and Kemp and Shimomura (2003).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transfers, Nontraded Goods, and Unemployment: An Analysis of the Keynes-Ohlin Debate

Brakman¹,

Marrewijk²

2007

History of Political Economy

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In the famous debate between Keynes and Ohlin on the transfer problem, the interaction between non-traded goods and unemployment complicates the analysis considerably. We analyze these issues using four different models to conclude that Keynes's concern regarding the large burden imposed on Germany was justified. Simultaneously, we show that Ohlin's presumption that a transfer does not affect the donor's terms-of-trade either favourably or unfavourably was also justified. Moreover, Ohlin was also right in asserting that a transfer tends to lower the price of non-traded goods for the donor and raise them for the recipient.JEL Code: B0, F0, O1.

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“…4 In the literature of tied aid, typically aid is tied to the recipient country's expenditure, not to the country's trade policy (see, for example, Kemp and Kojima, 1985;Schweinberger, 1990;and Hatzipanayotou and Michael, 1995). Two exceptions are Lahiri and Raimondos (1995) and Lahiri and Raimondos-M¿ller (1997a), who examine the welfare e®ects of aid tied to the reform of exogenously given quotas and tari®s, respectively.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal foreign aid and tariffs

Lahiri

Raimondos

Wong

et al. 2002

Journal of Development Economics

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This paper investigates the optimal choice of foreign aid when trade policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion. Three alternative scenarios, depending on the timing of the actions, and on whether aid is tied, are analyzed. It is shown that, in the case where aid is decided before tari®s, untied aid can lead to the reduction of the recipient's optimal trade tax. This opens up the possibility that optimal aid is positive and that the world achieves a Pareto-e±cient equilibrium. When the donor can tie the aid to a reduction in the recipient's tari®, the optimal aid level is always positive, and the world can always achieve a Pareto-e±cient equilibrium.JEL Classi¯cation: F13, F35, O0.

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On the Welfare Effects of Tied Aid

Cited by 52 publications

References 0 publications

The short and long run effects of tied foreign aid on pollution abatement, pollution and employment: A pilot model

The short and long run effects of tied foreign aid on pollution abatement, pollution and employment: A pilot model

Transfers, Nontraded Goods, and Unemployment: An Analysis of the Keynes-Ohlin Debate

Optimal foreign aid and tariffs

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