On Winners and Losers in Procurement Auctions

Abstract

g o t i a t i o n s . A u c t i o n t h e o r y i s b a s e d o n t w oassumptions which assure that auctions are efficient mechanisms, guarantee efficient solutions, and produce the best possible results for bid-takers. In practice these assumptions are often violated. The contribution of this paper is to propose a procedure for auctions-followed-by negotiations which retains important auction features such as process transparency and efficiency while allowing for increased social welfare. The unique feature of the procedure is the introduction of the winwin phase in which the market participants may attempt to make joint improvements to efficient solutions obtained from auctions.

Towards Paired Transactions Modeling

“…The constraints represent constraints or restrictions on populations of the fact types. The derivation rules include rules that may be used to derive new facts from other facts, see [6,12].…”

IT Outsourcing Auctions With Bilateral Efforts and Renegotiation

“…Reference [36] investigates a procurement model where the buyer audits the cost of the auction winner and then negotiates the final price with the winner. Reference [37] proposes a sequential ''auction + bargaining'' model which can increase the social welfare while maintaining desirable properties of auctions like transparency and allocation efficiency. Reference [38] analyzes the problem of auctioning incomplete contracts with renegotiations; it compares the efficacy of auction and negotiation in terms of incentivizing potential providers to reveal their private information about possible design improvements early.…”