Once The Shovel Hits the Ground: Evaluating the Management of Complex Implementation Processes of Public-Private Partnership Infrastructure Projects with Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Abstract

Tables 1.1. Outline of the Ph.d. thesis 3.1. variable-and case-oriented studies in transport infrastructure development 3.2. variable-oriented versus case-oriented approach 3.3. hypothetical truth table 4.1. unplanned events in the A2 Maastricht project 4.2. responding to unplanned events 4.3. calibration of conditions for mvQcA 4.4. data matrix (calibration version B) 4.5. truth table 4.6. results of the truth table minimization 5.1. events in the A15 highway project 5.2. The conditions 5.3. responding to events 5.4. data matrix 5.5. truth table 5.6. First results of the truth table minimization 5.7. Final results of the truth table minimization 5.8. responding to social events 6.1. Summary of the patterns found in the two studies 7.1. data matrix 7.2. truth table 7.3. conservative solution 7.4. intermediate solution 8.1. trade-offs between the two PPP implementation models 8.2. trade-offs between stakeholder inclusion and exclusion 7 These were no new problems, though. de hoo (1982) showed that conflicts of interest and governance problems also contributed to lengthy decision-making processes on infrastructure projects as early as the beginning of the 1960s. 8 The cPB-in dutch: Centraal Planbureau-is charged with the analysis of the economic effects of current and future government policies. The cPB is part of the Ministry of economic Affairs, but operates independently of it (see www.cpb.nl). 9 The nei (currently ecOrYS)-in dutch: Nederlands Economisch Instituut-is a research and consultancy firm specialized in applied economic research (see http: / / english.ecorys.nl/ nei). 10 in dutch: Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuurprojecten. 11 See, e.g., Metze (1997), Pestman (2001), and nieuwenhuis (2008) for accounts of the Betuweroute project. 12 This quote is translated from dutch. 18 This is not to say that PPPs are a new phenomenon. Grimsey and lewis (2004), for instance, provide historical examples of toll concessions-in Greece in the 1 st century Bc/ Ad, and in Britain during the Middle Ages-by public bodies to private parties, in return for which the private parties would maintain the roads. Also, the interest in PPPs in the netherlands was not restricted to the development of transport infrastructure projects (see, e.g., Kreukels & Spit, 1990). 19 in dutch: Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur en Transport. 20 See, e.g., eversdijk and Korsten (2009) for an elaborate account of the characteristics of, motivations for, and developments of dBFM in the netherlands. See also the DBFM Handbook that was published by the Knowledge centre PPP (2008). As relatively few dBFM projects have been delivered, the jury is still out as to whether dBFM lives up to its promises. 25 An earlier version of the article was published as a book chapter in Gerrits and Marks (2012); see verweij and Gerrits (2012a). to cater to practitioners, an introduction to QcA is published in dutch (verweij & Gerrits, 2012b). 26 A previous version of the article was published as a book chapter in Meek and Marshall (2014); see verweij and Gerrits (201...

Producing satisfactory outcomes in the implementation phase of PPP infrastructure projects: A fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis of 27 road constructions in the Netherlands

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“…This complicates access to projects. Relatedly, implementation data are often not made available as fears exist that analyses will lead to the identification of culprits for poor outcomes (see Verweij, 2015b).…”

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Public‐Private Partnerships: The Way They Were and What They Can Become

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