One Fault is All it Needs: Breaking Higher-Order Masking with Persistent Fault Analysis

Pan, Jingyu; Zhang, Fan; Ren, Kui; Bhasin, Shivam

doi:10.23919/date.2019.8715260

Cited by 16 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 12 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…bit we have to consider the shares from Eq. (15). Corrupting any single share of x 2 or x 1 exposes x 0 in this case.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most of the existing FA countermeasures are based on this belief and thus were broken. In a slightly different setting, the so-called Persistent Fault Analysis (PFA) [14,15] presented a similar result. The main reason behind the success of SIFA and PFA is that they typically exploit the statistical bias in the event when a fault fails to alter the computation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…In practice, we take the intersection between the key suggestions obtained from two different templates and can identify the key uniquely. As a concrete example for why it works, consider the key suggestion (13,15) from the first template. The second template will provide either of the two suggestion sets described in it.…”

Section: Attacks On Unmasked Implementations: Known Plaintextmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Fault Template Attacks on Block Ciphers Exploiting Fault Propagation

Saha

Bag

Roy

et al. 2020

Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Fault attacks (FA) are one of the potent practical threats to modern cryptographic implementations. Over the years the FA techniques have evolved, gradually moving towards the exploitation of devicecentric properties of the faults. In this paper, we exploit the fact that activation and propagation of a fault through a given combinational circuit (i.e., observability of a fault) is data-dependent. Next, we show that this property of combinational circuits leads to powerful Fault Template Attacks (FTA), even for implementations having dedicated protections against both power and fault-based vulnerabilities. The attacks found in this work are applicable even if the fault injection is made at the middle rounds of a block cipher, which are out of reach for most of the other existing fault analysis strategies. Quite evidently, they also work for a known-plaintext scenario. Moreover, the middle round attacks are entirely blind in the sense that no access to the ciphertexts (correct/faulty) or plaintexts are required. The adversary is only assumed to have the power of repeating an unknown plaintext several times. Practical validation over a hardware implementation of SCA-FA protected PRESENT, and simulated evaluation on a public software implementation of protected AES prove the efficacy of the proposed attacks.

show abstract

“…bit we have to consider the shares from Eq. (15). Corrupting any single share of x 2 or x 1 exposes x 0 in this case.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

Section: Attacks On Unmasked Implementations: Known Plaintextmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Fault Template Attacks on Block Ciphers Exploiting Fault Propagation

Saha

Bag

Roy

et al. 2020

Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We propose a novel, low-overhead and dedicated countermeasure against persistent fault injections in bijective substitution boxes that is not susceptible to further injections through redundant lookup tables. The need for this arises through the fact that common fault injection countermeasures, like area redundancy and masking of intermediate values, have been shown to be ineffective [16,13].…”

Section: Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Study of Persistent Fault Analysis

Caforio

Banik

2019

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Persistent faults mark a new class of injections that perturb lookup tables within block ciphers with the overall goal of recovering the encryption key. Unlike earlier fault types persistent faults remain intact over many encryptions until the affected device is rebooted, thus allowing an adversary to collect a multitude of correct and faulty ciphertexts. It was shown to be an efficient and effective attack against substitution-permutation networks. In this paper, the scope of persistent faults is further broadened and explored. More specifically, we show how to construct a key-recovery attack on generic Feistel schemes in the presence of persistent faults. In a second step, we leverage these faults to reverse-engineer AES-and PRESENT-like ciphers in a chosen-key setting, in which some of the computational layers, like substitution tables, are kept secret. Finally, we propose a novel, dedicated, and low-overhead countermeasure that provides adequate protection for hardware implementations against persistent fault injections.

show abstract

“…In their work [ZLZ + 18], the persistent fault is induced through rowhammer techniques and it persists in the DRAM of general processors. In [PZRB19], Pan et al shows that PFA can break higher-order masking countermeasures at any masking order with only one fault injection. In [MBD + 19], Menu et al demonstrates PFA by electromagnetic fault injections on data transfers on microcontroller.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Persistent Fault Attack in Practice

Zhang

Jiang

et al. 2020

TCHES

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Persistence fault analysis (PFA) is a novel fault analysis technique proposed in CHES 2018 and demonstrated with rowhammer-based fault injections. However, whether such analysis can be applied to traditional fault attack scenario, together with its difficulty in practice, has not been carefully investigated. For the first time, a persistent fault attack is conducted on an unprotected AES implemented on ATmega163L microcontroller in this paper. Several critical challenges are solved with our new improvements, including (1) how to decide whether the fault is injected in SBox; (2) how to use the maximum likelihood estimation to pursue the minimum number of ciphertexts; (3) how to utilize the unknown fault in SBox to extract the key. Our experiments show that: to break AES with physical laser injections despite all these challenges, the minimum and average number of required ciphertexts are 926 and 1641, respectively. It is about 38% and 28% reductions of the ciphertexts required in comparison to 1493 and 2273 in previous work where both fault value and location have to be known. Furthermore, our analysis is extended to the PRESENT cipher. By applying the persistent fault analysis to the penultimate round, the full PRESENT key of 80 bits can be recovered. Eventually, an experimental validation is performed to confirm the accuracy of our attack with more insights. This paper solves the challenges in most aspects of practice and also demonstrates the feasibility and universality of PFA on SPN block ciphers.

show abstract

One Fault is All it Needs: Breaking Higher-Order Masking with Persistent Fault Analysis

Cited by 16 publications

References 12 publications

Fault Template Attacks on Block Ciphers Exploiting Fault Propagation

Fault Template Attacks on Block Ciphers Exploiting Fault Propagation

A Study of Persistent Fault Analysis

Persistent Fault Attack in Practice

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About