One Kind of Power

Basu, Kaushik

doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041740

Cited by 118 publications

(82 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…However, an implicit assumption in most collective action studies is that social interaction is between individuals of relatively equal status and power, but this is, of course, not always the case, and particularly not so in rural societies. The literature on rural development has extensively documented the existence of patron-client networks, characterised as relationships of dependence and inequality, with the resource rich having considerable control over the activities of their peasant clients , Powell 1970, Bardhan 1984, Pitt-Rivers 1954, Auyero et al 2009, Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, Basu 1986). Putnam (1993) in his study of Italy argued that collective action within such hierarchical networks would be fairly limited due to the asymmetric distribution of power.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…In areas which are relatively isolated, and where there is high inequality, peasants would have few options aside from the patron to satisfy their needs. Such an environment leads to the establishment of 'authoritarian clientelism' , where the patron is in essence a monopolist/monopsonist in the rural economy (Bhaduri 1977), which enables him to influence his clients' behaviour and their third party interactions (Basu 1986). However, if one relaxes either of these two conditions, i.e.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Collective Action, Clientelism, and Connectivity

Shami

2012

Am Polit Sci Rev

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Collective Action, Clientelism, and Connectivity

Shami

2012

Am Polit Sci Rev

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“…Firstly, usually the households in a lineage have been clustered in a settlement for generations, and this long-term connection as well as the repeated nature of their interaction (possibility of needing help in the future) provides them with incentives to help other lineage members (Coate and Ravallion, 1993). Second, choosing not to help a lineage member would be like choosing to be disowned or to be denied other lineage benefits by being ostracized (Basu, 1986). Moreover, the obligation may be stronger as the size of the lineage increases (Pan, 2012).…”

Section: Why Lineage Composition Matters?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Lineage-based heterogeneity and cooperative behavior in rural China

Pan²,

Sarangi

2018

Journal of Comparative Economics

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This paper investigates how lineages, the commonly found organizations in rural villages of China, affect people's intra-and cross-lineage cooperative behavior. We use data from the Chinese Household Income Project Survey 2002, which exclusively contains information about the lineage structure in these villages allowing us to classify three levels of lineage-based heterogeneity. Our identification strategy relies on the exogeneity of lineage-based heterogeneity. We find evidence that people in a village with higher lineage-based heterogeneity are less likely to exhibit reciprocity behavior within lineages or contribute to the provision of public goods that are jointly shared across lineages. The estimation results remain robust to the inclusion of various control variables and additional background characteristics. Finally, we examine a number of other economic outcomes and find that more homogenous villages do better than other types of villages.JEL classification: D71; O12; O17; H41 Keywords: Cooperation; Lineage Networks; Reciprocity; Local Public Goods; China 1 We are grateful to R. Carter Hill for several suggestions. We are thankful to the editor Daniel Berkowitz and two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions. We also thank

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“…The proponents of social capital argue that such assets as networks, trust, and reciprocity assist households greatly during economic hardships and shocks (Durkheim 1895;Coleman 1988;Putnam 1993). For example, social capital helps economic exchange, particularly in agrarian societies where formal institutions are largely absent (Bardhan 1984;Basu 1986). Although many useful roles played by social capital are documented [Bakshi, Mallick, and Ulubaşoğlu (2015) provide a review], its role in mitigating the adverse effect of the Monga remains unexplored in the literature.…”

Section: Thementioning

confidence: 99%

Social capital as a coping mechanism for seasonal deprivation: the case of the Monga in Bangladesh

2018

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The extreme hunger and deprivation that recurs every year in the lean season in northern Bangladesh, locally known as the Monga, is mainly due to the malfunctioning local labor and credit markets. Using data covering 5,600 extreme poor households in the Mongaprone region, we investigate in detail the role of social capital in securing employment and obtaining informal loans. Correcting for the endogeneity of social capital by the heteroscedasticity-based method proposed by Klein and Vella (2010) and also by the standard IV method for a robustness check, we document that social capital plays an important role in obtaining both wage-and self-employment. We also document a weak negative effect of social capital on obtaining informal loans. We explain our results in terms of the role of horizontal and vertical components of our measures of social capital in influencing different outcomes.

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One Kind of Power

Cited by 118 publications

References 25 publications

Collective Action, Clientelism, and Connectivity

Collective Action, Clientelism, and Connectivity

Lineage-based heterogeneity and cooperative behavior in rural China

Social capital as a coping mechanism for seasonal deprivation: the case of the Monga in Bangladesh

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