One rule for the goose, one for the gander? The use of plea bargaining for high profile corruption cases in Nigeria

Abstract

Controversies have continued to trail the adoption and use of plea bargaining in the criminal justice administration in Nigeria, particularly in prosecuting high profile corruption cases. This paper interrogated the pros and cons of its application by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to recover looted funds from high profile corrupt public officials. Leaning heavily on sociological school, which emphasizes the relationship between law and the needs and institutions of the society, the article explored various schools of thought in law as regards the conceptualisation of plea bargaining, theoretical underpinnings of the emergence, adoption and the implication of its use on Nigeria's drive towards ensuring equality before the law. The selective use of plea bargaining in the country is adjudged to be counterproductive and inimical to the country's quest for social justice.

Plea bargain dilemma, financial crime and asset recovery

“…Importantly, plea bargain does not apply to all crimes in Nigeria and Pakistan. In Nigeria, EFCC performs investigation and prosecution of economic crime and financial misconduct, despite plenty of powers vested with, its efficiency is still under doubt in controlling financial crime (Aborisade and Adeleke, 2018; Alliyu, 2015). In the case of Pakistan, sections 25 and 26 of the NAO empower Chairman of the NAB to grant a full or conditional pardon in exchange for information and cooperation as well as return of the assets or gains acquired in return for a full discharge of criminal liability even without approval from the court.…”

“…Since the operation of PB has increased in the last three decades, and with it arose issues within the criminal justice system such as disproportionate punishment, lack of evidence, time duration available for PB, whether the concept has constitutional foundations, inadequate counsel available to the accused (Owens, Peter, 2017). The use of PB has also been criticized by some law scholarship (Abdullahi, 2014; Mudasiru, 2015; Aborisade and Adeleke, 2018; Ali, 2020) and argue that the PB process may be regulated or even prohibited (Bibas, 2011; McCannon, 2021), while some others have confirmed and admitted as a positive development (Adewumi, 2017; Syed, 2020; Nelson and Santoso, 2020).…”

“…Much of the literature is available on the concept of PB; it is largely focused on its application and role in the criminal justice system (Alschuler, 1979; Adeleke, 2012; Aborisade and Adeleke, 2018), PB interaction models (Maynard, 1982; Petersen et al , 2020), how individual bargains are achieved. Besides these, two important comprehensive and comparative studies are available: one on the PB process used in America, England and Asia Pacific which provided valuable insights and discriminating features across jurisdictions (Brook et al , 2015) and another on the prosecutorial discretion in using PB across Europe and the USA (Ma, 2002).…”

Combating the Cankerworm of Corruption through Plea Bargaining in Nigeria

“…17 Though some of these laws through their agencies have been able to record remarkable achievements, overtime their exposition, recovery and sentencing rate have failed to catch up with the geometric rise of corruption in the country. 24 Some of these laws and agencies include the Economic and Financial Crime Commission Act and its agency and the Administration of the Criminal Justice Act 2015 which shall be examined.…”

“…43 It is further alluded that its introduction is linked to the fact that the increasingly growing number of pending trials especially cases pending due to the inadequate evidence to prove culpability beyond reasonable doubt was one of the reason it was used. 44 In addition, there were also the issue of undue delays occasioned by either interlocutory applications or delay tactics which were used by lawyers to the end, that cases lasted for over ten years with the attendant result that witnesses could not be reached because they have died, relocated or have forgotten facts of cases. These difficulties provided the platform for plea bargain in Nigeria.…”