Online versus Cognitive Control: A Dividing Line between Physical Action and Motor Imagery

Abstract

Motor imagery has long been characterised as the internal experience of the silent unfolding of motor processes, known as the Functional Equivalence view. We argue that a stronger account of motor imagery incorporates how it differs from physical action, as encapsulated in the Motor-Cognitive model. The Motor-Cognitive model argues that in lieu of online control, motor imagery is elaborated using cognitive processes relying on executive resources. We tested the Motor-Cognitive and Functional Equivalence models in experiments that manipulated the quality of information available during movement through 1) removing vision; 2) restricting vision to the periphery; or 3) miming the movement. All three experiments found strong evidence in favour of the Motor-Cognitive model and against the Functional Equivalence view. We discuss these results in the broader context of the processes involved in mental imagery.