Abstract:In this article, I identify a distinctive form of injustice—ontic injustice—in which an individual is wronged by the very fact of being socially constructed as a member of a certain social kind. To be a member of a certain social kind is, at least in part, to be subject to certain social constraints and enablements, and these constraints and enablements can be wrongful to the individual who is subjected to them, in the sense that they inflict a moral injury. The concept of ontic injustice is valuable in three … Show more
“…Additionally, Katharine Jenkins has recently developed an analysis of ontic injustice, a kind of injustice that concerns a wrong done to one in virtue of being constructed as a member of a particular social kind. Jenkins defines ontic injustice : “An individual suffers ontic injustice if and only if they are socially constructed as a member of a certain social kind where that construction consists, at least in part, of their being subjected to a set of social constraints and enablements that is wrongful to them” (Jenkins 2020, 191, italics added). The notion of ontic injustice helps to shed further light upon the productive function and power that conceptual resources can have.…”
Section: The Productive Function Of Hermeneutical Resourcesmentioning
This article develops a new approach for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice. According to a dominant view, hermeneutical injustice results from a hermeneutical gap: one lacks the conceptual tools needed to make sense of, or to communicate, important social experiences, where this lack is a result of an injustice in the background social methods used to determine hermeneutical resources. I argue that this approach is incomplete. It fails to capture an important species of hermeneutical injustice which doesn't result from a lack of hermeneutical resources, but from the overabundance of distorting and oppressive concepts which function to crowd-out, defeat, or pre-empt the application of a more accurate hermeneutical resource. I propose a broader analysis that better respects the dynamic relationship between hermeneutical resources and the social and political contexts in which they are implemented.
“…Additionally, Katharine Jenkins has recently developed an analysis of ontic injustice, a kind of injustice that concerns a wrong done to one in virtue of being constructed as a member of a particular social kind. Jenkins defines ontic injustice : “An individual suffers ontic injustice if and only if they are socially constructed as a member of a certain social kind where that construction consists, at least in part, of their being subjected to a set of social constraints and enablements that is wrongful to them” (Jenkins 2020, 191, italics added). The notion of ontic injustice helps to shed further light upon the productive function and power that conceptual resources can have.…”
Section: The Productive Function Of Hermeneutical Resourcesmentioning
This article develops a new approach for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice. According to a dominant view, hermeneutical injustice results from a hermeneutical gap: one lacks the conceptual tools needed to make sense of, or to communicate, important social experiences, where this lack is a result of an injustice in the background social methods used to determine hermeneutical resources. I argue that this approach is incomplete. It fails to capture an important species of hermeneutical injustice which doesn't result from a lack of hermeneutical resources, but from the overabundance of distorting and oppressive concepts which function to crowd-out, defeat, or pre-empt the application of a more accurate hermeneutical resource. I propose a broader analysis that better respects the dynamic relationship between hermeneutical resources and the social and political contexts in which they are implemented.
“…In a recent article, Katharine Jenkins argues that most accounts of social kinds either explicitly or implicitly hold that social kinds are constituted by constraints and enablements. Specifically, she argues that “there is an implicit consensus among different accounts of social ontology that what it is to be a member of a certain social kind is, at least in part, to be subject to certain social constraints and enablements” (Jenkins, , p. 1). Let us call the subject of the so‐called “implicit consensus” in social ontology the Constraints and Enablements Thesis :CET: Social kinds are constituted by social constraints and enablements …”
Section: Ontic Injustice and The “Implicit Consensus”mentioning
In a recent article, Katharine Jenkins argues that most accounts of social kinds either explicitly or implicitly hold that social kinds are constituted by constraints and enablements. Specifically, she argues that "there is an implicit consensus among different accounts of social ontology that what it is to be a member of a certain social kind is, at least in part, to be subject to certain social constraints and enablements" (Jenkins, 2020, p. 1). Let us call the subject of the so-called "implicit consensus" in social ontology the Constraints and Enablements Thesis:CET: Social kinds are constituted by social constraints and enablements. 1 Jenkins uses CET to develop an account of a phenomenon she calls ontic injustice. According to Jenkins, this is a distinctively ontic form of injustice whereby "an individual is wronged by the very fact of being socially constructed as a member of a certain social kind" (p. 1). To illustrate the nature of this phenomenon, Jenkins provides the following example:Consider the situation of wives in England and Wales prior to 1991, which is when the marital rape exemption was ended in these countries. Prior to 1991, if a husband had sex with his wife without her agreement, including by force, this did not constitute rape in the eyes of the law, as it was deemed that in getting married the wife had consented in perpetuity to sex with her husband. Accordingly, an individual socially constructed as a wife lacked the social entitlement to refuse to have sex with her husband. According to many accounts of social ontology, including Searle's and Asta's, what it was to be a wife in England and Wales prior to 1991Thanks to an anonymous referee, Katharine Jenkins, Nick Leonard, Michaela McSweeney, and Katherine Ritchie for their helpful feedback on previous versions of this paper.
“…(2016, 504-505) 16 We might also think about Dembroff's notion of ontological oppression here, specifically its second formulation: "The structures and practices within a social context can unjustly fail to recognize or construct certain kinds" (Dembroff,forthcoming,5). We might think that just as when nonbinary people face ontological oppression due to the failure of actual societies to recognize or construct appropriate gender kinds for those nonbinary people, trans men and women face ontological oppression in a society that abolishes gender (see, for another way of thinking about this issue, Jenkins [2016]).…”
Section: Transgender Identities and Abolitionismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We will later see a version of the argument that will attempt to make a conceptual link between gender and harms. 7 For a detailed account of what we might call "ontic injustices," injustices in virtue of being treated as a member of a given category, seeJenkins (2016)…”
Analytic metaphysics of gender has taken an ameliorative turn towards ethical and political questions regarding what our concept of gender ought to be, and how gendered society should be structured. Abolitionism about gender, which claims that we ought to mandate gender out of existence, has therefore seen renewed interest. I consider three arguments for abolitionism from radically different perspectives: Haslanger’s simple argument, Escalante’s Gender Nihilism, and Okin’s argument from ideal theory. I argue that none of the above manage to establish the desirability of abolitionism and that we should be wary of the abolitionist position, as it imperils trans lives.
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