Ontogenesis Versus Morphogenesis Towards an Anti-realist Model of the Constitution of Society

Abstract

This article firstly criticizes Margaret Archer's Morphogenetic Approach for being indecisive about the realist notion of emergence it proposes as well as for her inadequate account of structural conditioning. It is argued that critical realists' conceptualizations of emergence cannot but lead to inconsistencies about the adequate placement of agents as parts of emergent entities. The inconsistencies to which these conceptualizations lead necessitate an anti-realist model of the constitution of societies which takes into account that social structures are existentially dependent upon ideational elaboration. This alternative anti-realist theoretical perspective is provided by Ontogenesis, within the framework of which the realists' idea of the 'necessary and internal relations' give their place to the ontological pervasiveness of the culturally shared imaginary schemata. Archer's denial of a collective synchronic impact to social forms is implied in her analysis of morphogenetic cycles, according to which, structural elaboration postdates social interaction; and this denial is also expressed in this very idea of emergent structures. Instead, for Ontogenesis, social forms are synchronically dependent on the collective impact of the differently socially placed agents, who have different interests and material resources, and whose interaction only becomes meaningful when drawing on these culturally shared imaginary schemata.

On the assumption of self-reflective subjectivity

“…It is unintelligible how it has become the norm to talk about 'discourses' as the imaginary 'space' of 'passive' internalization, without also allowing for a dialogic subjectivity that can reflect on the various levels we discussed in the first section. This notion of subjectivity highlights the idea of the internalization of world views and normative orientations, as one moment of the dialectic between internalization and agency (see Bouzanis, 2016). This approach can also ensure that the multivocality of the self does not negate the continuity and integrity of the subject (on this, see Falmagne, 2004).…”

“…Allow me, at this point, and before moving forwards, to clearly underline the poverty of our metaphors of self-reflection (agential reflexivity) in our early efforts to understand the ‘mechanisms’ and processes of this enigmatic phenomenon. Introspection and self-dialogue, of course, are not mere metaphors; they are real expressions of the broader phenomenon of self-reflection – for, after all, our reflective imagination is expressed in visualizations and scientific modelling, in which iconic imaging is the key feature (see Bouzanis, 2016; Harré, 1975), and day-dreaming is usually expressed in inner dialogues. But we are still lacking a platform theory (combining inputs from the various human sciences) of how to incorporate introspection and self-dialogue into a generic ontology of self-reflection.…”

“…We can find ‘milder’ versions of this phenomenon in the contemporary literature in the tradition of critical realism, a school of thought that has clearly – and persuasively at some points – denounced functionalism. And yet, the idea of emergence has triggered interpretations in which agents are understood as both self-reflective and intentional and, at the same time, lower-level entities that participate in modes of circular causality in the composition of higher-level entities (for a discussion, see Bouzanis, 2016).…”

For reflexivity as an epistemic criterion of ontological coherence and virtuous social theorizing

“…Now, although the idea of the priority of ontology over epistemology and methodology partly originated in realist social philosophy ( Bhaskar, 1979 , 2009 ), it has also been adopted by social constructionism 6 ( Searle, 2008 ) and social anti-realism ( Bouzanis, 2016 ); it can be encapsulated in the post-positivist idea of the ‘metaphysics of science’. In this field, Agassi (1964) has argued that metaphysical doctrines are views of the world that constitute coordinating frameworks which regulate the field of scientific research by attaching significance to certain (and not other) theories, experiments, problems, etc (see Kim, 2017 : 110).…”

“…Conflicting scientific world-imageries are intertwined with conflicting philosophical world-imageries, and both constitute the ideational background which is the object of reflection in what Chalmers calls ‘ontological discourse’ (2009: 91). Following these lines, ontologies can be conceived of as conceptual frameworks that express certain metaphysical imaginary schemata and which provide empirical research with a categorical scheme introducing abstract, holistic, theoretical and unobservable entities (see Bouzanis, 2016 ).…”