Ontological Symmetry in Language: A Brief Manifesto

Abstract

: In the tradition of quantified modal logic, it was assumed that significantly different linguistic systems underlie reference to individuals, to times and to ‘possible worlds’. Various results from recent research in formal semantics suggest that this is not so, and that there is in fact a pervasive symmetry between the linguistic means with which we refer to these three domains. Reference to individuals, times and worlds is uniformly effected through generalized quantifiers, definite descriptions, and pronouns, and in each domain grammatical features situate the reference of terms as near, far or ‘further’ from the actual or from a reported speech act. We outline various directions in which a program of ontological symmetry could be developed, and we offer in the a symmetric fragment developed in a logic that can be seen as a compromise between an extensional and an intensional system.

If-Clauses and Probability Operators

“…2 In what follows we will ignore these complexities, however, in order to see what the Lewis-Kratzer view implies for expressions of probability more generally. The general strategy we shall pursue is much in the spirit of the hypothesis of semantic uniformity presented in Schlenker (2006), according to which quantification over times, individuals and worlds, is constrained by general mechanisms that operate alike in the three domains. Following Lewis (1975), Schlenker points out that the sentences ''most of the time, when John comes, Mary is happy'', ''probably, if John comes, Mary will be happy'', and ''most men are wise'' or ''most of the water is poisonous'', are susceptible of essentially the same semantic analysis.…”

The Problem of Cross-world Predication

“…Suppose we replace fictional worlds in our models with fictional possibilities-that is, possible states which do not determinately decide for every sentence whether that sentence is true or false. 36 In doing so, we could reinterpret [Holmes] so that this operator (instead of checking every fictional world compatible with the Holmes stories) simply shifts the world of evaluation to the fictional possibility of the Holmes stories. In making this move, (48) doesn't have the problem stated above-only one Sherlock Holmes is picked out by the use of t sherlock above.…”

“…See Partee[31], Cresswell[10], Stone[39], Kratzer[23],King [21], Schlenker[36], and Schaffer[35] for a discussion.…”

The grammar of quantification and the fine structure of interpretation contexts

“…We are therefore able to capture the systematic anaphoric and quantificational parallels between the individual and modal domains argued for in Frank (1996), van Rooy (1998), Stone (1999), Bittner (2001) and Schlenker (2005) among others (building on Partee 1973Partee , 1984. (94) John x thinks w ½ w that he x will w catch a y fish and he x hopes w ¾ w,w ½ I will w ¾ grill it y tonight.…”