Ontology Made Easy

Thomasson, Amie L.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199385119.001.0001

Cited by 130 publications

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“…I should also note that, though Quine is of course an enormously influential philosopher, there are not perhaps many philosophers today who could properly be said to follow Quine in all respects of his 20 Exactly in what sense Price is a naturalist will be an important theme of the current section. I also note that Thomasson (2015b) defends a neo-Carnapian position similar to Price's, but sees it as dependent on upholding the analytic-synthetic distinction. In accord with Quine's broader epistemological naturalism, I think we should do without the latter.…”

Section: Is Quinean Object Naturalism Irrational or Unmotivated?mentioning

confidence: 91%

Global expressivism and the flight from metaphysics

Knowles

2016

Synthese

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Section: Is Quinean Object Naturalism Irrational or Unmotivated?mentioning

confidence: 91%

Global expressivism and the flight from metaphysics

Knowles

2016

Synthese

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“…159, 162-3, 2009bThomasson ( , p. 6n8, 2013Thomasson ( , pp. 1023Thomasson ( , 1025Thomasson ( -1030Thomasson ( , 1033Thomasson ( , 1036Thomasson ( , 1038Thomasson ( -1040Thomasson ( , 1045Thomasson ( , 1049Thomasson ( , 2015Thomasson ( , pp. 14, 21, 33-34, 39, 47-50, 56, 73, 111, 127-132, 134-135, 136-156, 159, 172-173, 180, 191-196, 202-203, 205, 217, 219, 221, 229-232, 247, 251-254, 257, 273-276, 280, 282-284, 290-293, 296, 301, 318, 323, 2016.…”

Section: Not-so-easy Ontologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Deflationary metaphysics and ordinary language

Button¹

2017

Preprint

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Amie Thomasson and Eli Hirsch have both attempted to deflate metaphysics, by combining Carnapian ideas with an appeal to ordinary language. My main aim in this paper is to critique such deflationary appeals to ordinary language. Focussing on Thomasson, I draw two very general conclusions. First: ordinary language is a wildly complicated phenomenon. Its implicit ontological commitments can only be tackled by invoking a context principle; but this will mean that ordinary language ontology is not a trivial enterprise. Second: ordinary language often points in different directions simultaneously, so that a wide variety of existence questions cannot be deflated merely by appealing to ordinary language. Keywords Thomasson's easy ontologyThomasson wants to deflate existence questions. She attempts to do so, not by dismissing them as nonsensical, but by providing them with easy answers. I shall begin by outlining some of Thomasson's model questions and answers. 1 1 Thomasson (2009b, pp. 8-12, 2013, pp. 1025-1027, 2015, pp. 37, 102-103, 106-107, 129-153, 258, 2016. Thomasson, of course, notes that plenty of existence questions require serious empirical work, e.g. 'are there faster-than-light neutrinos?' However, such questions are not the concern of this paper. I shall not repeat this caveat in what follows, but it holds throughout.B Tim Button button@cantab.net

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“…There have been several recent discussions about the relevance of simplicity to philosophy, including Bennett (2009), Kriegel (2013), Sider (2013), Tallant (2013), Willard (2014), Thomasson (2015), Huemer (2016), Biggs and Wilson (2017), Paul (2016) and Brenner (2017). However, even those who have defended the use of simplicity in philosophy have not challenged Huemer's arguments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophers should prefer simpler theories

Bradley

2017

Philos Stud

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Recent years have seen considerable attention paid to the methodology of philosophy. The puzzle is simple-if philosophy is not an empirical discipline, how can one philosophical theory be rationally preferred over another? One answer to this question is that we should apply the theoretical virtues. Foremost among these theoretical virtues is simplicity-so perhaps we should prefer simpler philosophical theories to more complex ones. Huemer (Philos Q 59:216-236, 2009) objects that the reasons to prefer simpler theories in science do not apply in philosophy. I will argue that Huemer is mistaken-the arguments he marshals for preferring simpler theories in science can also be applied in philosophy. Like Huemer, I will focus on the philosophy of mind and the nominalism/Platonism debate. But I want to engage with the broader issue of whether simplicity is relevant to philosophy.

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Ontology Made Easy

Cited by 130 publications

References 0 publications

Global expressivism and the flight from metaphysics

Global expressivism and the flight from metaphysics

Deflationary metaphysics and ordinary language

Philosophers should prefer simpler theories

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