Opening Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements: More Flexibility to Save Jobs?

Abstract

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What happened to collective bargaining during the great recession?

“…Addison et al (2015b), using the IAB panel survey, report that up to 40 percent of all firms under collective agreements have recourse to opening clauses, whereas up to 70 percent, in 2011, responded that they have used these clauses. According to the IAW collective agreements database about one third of the opening clauses are about pay and half are about working time (Brändle and Heinbach 2010). Most clauses are restricted in time and many rely on an agreement with the union (metal-engineering) or the works council (chemical industry).…”

“…Haipeter (2013) argues that in both industries the use of opening clauses has stabilised at a level of about 10 percent of all firms. Opening clauses in Germany has been associated with higher wage increases (Fitzenberger and Franz 1999;Brändle and Heinbach 2010). On the basis of the 2011 IAB enterprise survey Ellguth et al (2012:9) find that firms pay for these clauses with a 7 percent higher wage, but that the use of opening clauses triggers a reduction of 9 percent.…”

Productividad en las empresas manufactureras alemanas. ¿Influye el empleo temporal?

“…En virtud de la Ley de convenios colectivos, estos se negocian a escala regional y sectorial entre los sindicatos y las organizaciones de empleadores (Brändle y Heinbach, 2013;Tüselmann y Heise, 2000). Ello se aplica sobre todo desde que el artículo 87 de la Ley de comités de empresa limita el derecho de estos a negociar asuntos sobre los cuales existe un convenio colectivo en vigor, como las escalas salariales, las horas de trabajo, etc.…”

“…Ello se aplica sobre todo desde que el artículo 87 de la Ley de comités de empresa limita el derecho de estos a negociar asuntos sobre los cuales existe un convenio colectivo en vigor, como las escalas salariales, las horas de trabajo, etc. Estos convenios proporcionan un nivel mínimo de protección a los trabajado-res: las empresas pueden ofrecer a sus asalariados mejores condiciones, pero no peores (Brändle y Heinbach, 2013). En virtud de la Ley de convenios colectivos, estos se negocian a escala regional y sectorial entre los sindicatos y las organizaciones de empleadores (Brändle y Heinbach, 2013;Tüselmann y Heise, 2000).…”

OECD Economic Surveys: Spain

“…In fact, Brändle and Heinbach (2010) find for Germany that the existence of opening clauses increases employment by 0.8%. In fact, Brändle and Heinbach (2010) find for Germany that the existence of opening clauses increases employment by 0.8%.…”