Conte, bu in particular to Giulia Andrighetto for her insightful suggestions and challenging perspectives on the topic. I also express my gratitude to Anup K. Kalia, Nirav Ajmeri, Munindar P. Singh and Tina Balke to our meetings and enlightening discussions. I would thus like to thank the financial support provided by the University Global Partnership Network (UGPN) that made possible these meetings and discussions.Special thanks to my parents and sisters, for all their support during the period of this study. I would also like to thank all my friends, that near or distant (more distant than near), were extremely important for me to reach this goal.
AbstractThe increasing interest on greater agent's autonomy in addition to its adaptability, bounded rationality, and heterogeneity features, and the necessity of interaction and cooperation may bring Multiagent Systems (MASs) to exhibit undesirable global behaviors. It may become even worse especially when they involve human agents who are less manageable and predictable in their actions, like in Sociotechnical Systems (STSs). These characteristics render an effective governance an essential aspect of these systems. The normative approach has been proposed as a prominent means to achieve this effectiveness, wherein norms provide a socially realistic view of interaction among autonomous parties that abstracts away low-level implementation details. Overlaid on norms is the notion of a sanction as a reaction to potentially any violation of or compliance with an expectation. Although norms have been well investigated in the context of MASs, sanctions still lack a more comprehensive inspection. We address the above-mentioned gap by proposing, first, a typology of sanctions that reflects the interplay of relevant features of STSs, second, a sanctioning enforcement process describing the functions of the diversity of components and their relationships, and third a sanctioning evaluation model that enables agents to evaluate and choose the most appropriate sanction to apply depending on a set of factors. In particular, this evaluation model enables the selection between formal or social sanctions based on how much the sanctioner can influence the social group of the sanctioned agent. This model is used to evaluate mono-type and multi-type sanctioning policies in a Smart Grid energy trading case study. Our results show that multi-type sanctioning policies do not always increase the level of norm compliance compared to mono-type sanctioning policies, yet multi-type policies are less costly.