Opposition and dissidence: Two modes of resistance against international rule

Abstract

Rule is commonly conceptualized with reference to the compliance it invokes. In this article, we propose a conception of rule via the practice of resistance instead. In contrast to liberal approaches, we stress the possibility of illegitimate rule, and, as opposed to critical approaches, the possibility of legitimate authority. In the international realm, forms of rule and the changes they undergo can thus be reconstructed in terms of the resistance they provoke. To this end, we distinguish between two types of resistanceopposition and dissidence-in order to demonstrate how resistance and rule imply each other. We draw on two case studies of resistance in and to international institutions to illustrate the relationship between rule and resistance and close with a discussion of the normative implications of such a conceptualization.

What’s in a name? Contestation and backlash against international norms and institutions

“…While it is initially plausible to increase the property space of the concept by divorcing it from its normative connotation as being regressive by nature, the question arises whether the remaining concept is not superfluous. In fact, other conceptualisations from norms research such as the distinction between applicatory versus validity contestation or from resistance research between reform and revolution or between opposition and dissidence (Daase and Deitelhoff, 2019) seem to apply to the same phenomena. They similarly highlight a form of particularly radical contestation that targets the core of a norm or institution that also relies on extraordinary means, that is, not playing by the accepted rules of the game.…”

Potentiality, political protest and constituent power: A response to the special issue

“…2 For Daase and Deitelhoff, rule is the primary question of post-Cold War IR theory, supplanting anarchy as the fundamental question in both empirical and normative terms. Given conflicting descriptions of the polarity, rigidity and formality of world order, ‘rule’ serves as a problematique confronted from many sides (Daase and Deitelhoff, 2019). This is true especially in the investigation of resistance, which (we are told in a curious reversal of Foucault) highlights rule because that is always the object of resistance (Daase and Deitelhoff, 2019: 17).…”

“…Given conflicting descriptions of the polarity, rigidity and formality of world order, ‘rule’ serves as a problematique confronted from many sides (Daase and Deitelhoff, 2019). This is true especially in the investigation of resistance, which (we are told in a curious reversal of Foucault) highlights rule because that is always the object of resistance (Daase and Deitelhoff, 2019: 17). While Niesen (2019a) is correct to note that contributors ground their investigations in different assumptions about rule and resistance, it is undeniable that they all engage the ‘rule problematique’ by their interest in its central forces – rule and resistance.…”

“…Daase and Deitelhoff discuss two modes of resistance to rule common to inter-/trans-national and domestic contexts 3 – opposition and dissidence. Both ‘voice dissent and formulate – albeit in varying degrees – political alternatives to the ruling order’, but differ insofar as opposition ‘accept[s] that order and the applicable rules of political order and compl[ies] with them’ whereas dissidence ‘reject[s] or deliberately violate[s] these rules’ (Daase and Deitelhoff, 2019: 19). The separation appears in the scope of their resistance: opposition questions a policy or a political process, and dissidence entails the broader rejection of the polity .…”

“…The less-radical approaches discussed in the special issue would fit in the first mode of political protest and constitution. Daase and Deitelhoff’s (2019: 19) ‘opposition’ describes a form of protest that accepts the existing order and its rules, but disagrees with a policy. Scheuerman’s (2019) ringing endorsement of civil disobedience lies particularly in its respect for the existing constituency and juridical structure (2019: 53–54).…”