Opposition at the Margins: Strategies against the Erosion of Democracy in Colombia and Venezuela

Abstract

The erosion of democracy has become increasingly common. Faced with economic and security crises, democratically elected presidents in Latin America, 1 Eastern Europe, 2 and Africa 3 have used their popularity to introduce constitutional amendments that destroy the system of checks and balances, hinder free and fair elections, and dismantle political rights and civil liberties. In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez eroded democracy. Using institutional reforms, he slowly turned a democracy into a competitive authoritarian regime. In Colombia, Alvaro Uribe tried to do the same, but failed. Despite his efforts to undermine the independence of courts and congress, and the fairness of elections, Colombia's constitutional order remained fairly strong. Why, despite similar circumstances, do some presidents successfully erode democracy, while others fail? The literature on democratic reversals has often thought of transitions away from democracy as dependent upon institutions, 4 economic development, 5 or state strength. 6 Contrary to these approaches, 7 I highlight the role of the opposition. Democratic erosion is a transition from democracy to autocracy that happens over time, giving the opposition several opportunities to respond. The goals and strategies it uses to fight the president's initial attempts to undermine checks and balances are, therefore, critical to better understand these leaders' ability to successfully increase the powers of the executive and extend their time in office beyond a second term. If the opposition uses institutions or extra-institutional strategies with moderate goals to fight the government, it keeps its legitimacy domestically and abroad. It reduces the incentives and increases the costs of repression, allowing the opposition to keep some presence in the legislature and be better equipped to repeal more aggressive reforms down the road. If, however, the opposition retaliates outside institutions hoping to oust the president before the end of his constitutional term, it loses legitimacy domestically and abroad. Such a response increases the incentives and decreases the costs of repression, providing the president with more leeway to remove opposition leaders from office, prosecute or jail them, and enough support to push for more aggressive reforms.

Explanations of Institutional Change: Reflecting on a “Missing Diagonal”

“…Against this backdrop, a number of important research projects and publications have tackled the problem of setbacks, interestingly often under the banner of "democratic erosion." Drawing attention to only some prominent publications in the last years, McFaul (2018) discusses, for example, the "erosion of Russian democracy," Gamboa (2017) the "erosion of democracy in Colombia and Venezuela," Bermeo (2016, 14) puts forward that "troubled democracies today are more likely to erode rather than to shatter," and Diamond (2015, 147) observes the "significant erosion in electoral fairness, political pluralism, and civic space for opposition and dissent" in Turkey.…”

Introduction: The nature of political opposition in contemporary electoral democracies and autocracies

“…This may include the formation of pre-election alliances and post-election coalitions, as well as organizing electoral boycotts. While there are few, if any, hard-and-fast rules of how exactly to deal with particular challenges, research on political oppositions in Venezuela and Colombia suggests that it is worthwhile for the opposition to make use of the institutional leverage a regime provides them with, rather than to rely primarily or exclusively on radical extra-institutional strategies (Gamboa 2017).…”

Agency and Structure in Latin American Regime Change

“…Whether parties tolerate each other as legitimate institutions or see each other as enemies has critical consequences for regime survival and change (Cohen, 1994). Gamboa (2017) argues that democracies can survive leaders with authoritarian tendencies if the political parties in the opposition behave strategically to preserve the regime. Radicalised opposition parties can undermine democratic regimes.…”